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Chronological table of Augustine's life and educational writings
354

Augustine born at Thagaste

371

Goes to Carthage for the first time

372

Takes a concubine and Patricius dies

373

Reads Hortensius, birth of Adeodatus
Consecation of Ambrose

383

Sails for Rome

384

Appointed professor of rhetoric in Milan

385

Monica arrives in Milan

386

Conversion at the end of August, goes to
Cassiciacum (September) writes Contra
Academicos, De Beata Vita, De Ordine or

Divine Providence and The Problem of Evil
(December), Sotiquia (winter).
387

Baptism on Easter, writes De immortalitate

anima
Death of Monica
389

Death of Adeodatus

396

De Doctrina Christiana

397

Confessiones

399

De natura boni contra Manichaeum, De
Trinitate

405
410
413

Contra Creconium grammaticum
Alaric enters Rome, Roman refugees to Africa
De civitate Dei, I-III (written before the death
Marcellinus)

De civitate Dei, IV-V
415

De civitate Dei, VI-X

417

De civitate Dei, XI-XIII

420

De civitate Dei, XVII

425

De civitate Dei, XVIII
De civitate Dei, XIX-XXII

430

Death and burial of Augustine, the ravaging of
Numidia by Vandals.'

Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo. (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969),
cf. pp. 16, 74, 184, 282, and 378. Brown gives a detailed chronology of the major
historical events during Augustine's lifetime and also lists all his major works.

Outline for a Master of Sacred Theology Paper

Thesis statement It is the purpose of this paper to examine Augustine's
use or discarding of the classical methodology of education as found in
his works de Ordine and de Doctrines Christiana.
Introduction: The tension in the early church between the Christian faith
and pagan culture found a compromise in Augustine's declaration: "Every
good and true Christian should understand that wherever he may find
truth, it is the Lord's". This he declared in de Doctrines Christiana, 396.
L Historical Background
A.

The ancient Homeric paideia

B.

The conflict between the philosophical and the rhetorical
truth claims within the classical methodology of education
1. Plato and the philosophical tradition
2. Isocrates and the rhetorical tradition
a.

The influence of Cicero's Hortensius

b.

Augustine's compromise: the rhetor in the service
of truth

C.

The classical weltanschauung before Augustine

D.

A summary of the classical methodology of education

De Ordine: Augustine's use or discarding of the classical
II.
educational methodology in his de Ordine or Divine Providence and the
Problem of Evil:

Augustine. On Christian Doctrine. Translated with introduction by D. W. Robertson,
Jr. ( New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1958), p. 54.

2
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A.

Augustine's use of classical educational goals leads the
wise, godly person to live a happy life (beata vita) in the
cruel Roman world.
1.
2.
3.

B.

To know God
To know one's soul
To live the happy life, beats vita

Augustine uses the classical methodology of education to
find the answer to the question: can one perceive and grasp
an order of reality (ordinem rerum) by which the entire
universe is held together and governed (coercetur ac
regitur)?
1.

"Order is an arrangement of similar and dissimilar
things, assigning its proper place to each one."'

2.

"Order is that by which God governs all things that
are.314

3.
4..

"But with God, order always was"5
"Order is that which will lead us to God, if we hold to
it during life; unless we do hold to it during life, we shall
not come to God."'

Augustine, de Ordine. annotations by Robert Russell. ( New York: Cosmopolitan
Science & Art Service Co., Inc., 1942), p. 183.

3

Ibid., Bk. II, cap. N, par. XI, pp. 92-93. Ordo est quo Deus agit omnia quae suns, si
etiam stulus quae agit, agit ordine.
4

5

Ibid., Bk. II, cap. VII, par. XXIII, pp. 114-115. Sed semper erat ordo apud Deum.

6

Ibid., Bk. I, cap. IX, par. XXVII pp. 50-53. Ordo est quem si tenuerimus in vita,

perducet ad Deum, et quem nisi tenuerimus in vita, non perveniemus ad
Deum.
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C.

Related questions
1.

Are there events that occur by chance and
outside order?

2.

Does God will evil?

3.

The role of the senses

4..

5.

a.

The eyes sense movement and color

b.

The ears sense sound

Augustine's personal journey of faith sought wholeness
in the One God.
a.

His soul, cleansed by virtue, seeks oneness or
unity.

b.

His mind uses memory as its slave.

c.

His reason, capable of philosophical reflection,
makes sense out of cruel changes.

The soul (anima) seeks to return to the one (unum)
immovable God.
a.

God is the highest reason and the over-soul
of the world to which the soul of people returns.

b.

God is just because He gives each one his due.

c.

The One, immovable God came among us in
the Incarnation of His Son.

ix
6.

Augustine's use or discarding of the classical use of
poetry, philosophy and rhetoric (the liberal arts) in the
wise man's pursuit of the happy life, beats vita.
a.

Augustine's criticism of poetically inclined
Licentius.

b.

Augustine's criticism of the vanity of rhetoric.

c.

Philosophy, the dialogical end of liberal arts.

7.

The place of Augustine's mother, Monica, and authority
are in keeping with the classical methodology.

8.

What then is evil?

9.

a.

The teacher who teaches grammar before the
alphabet.

b.

The poet who uses solecisms and barbarisms.

The wise man's enjoyment of God, who orders all things,
overcomes all evil and is the answer to moires, fate.

III. De Doctrina Christiana The use and discarding of the classical
methodolgy of education in de Doctrina Christiana to train the
aspiring Scriptural exegete and ecclesiastical orator in the proper
rules of Scriptural interpretation and in teaching its truths
A.

A proper understanding of Scripture leads to the same
goal that philosophy leads to--to enjoy the Highest Good, the
One God, the Trinity.

B.

Scripture, when understood properly, leads to enjoyment
and love of God and love of others, including love of one's
enemies.

x

C.

1.

As the classical study of philosophy took one away
from the things of this life, a study of Scripture
exposes one's love of temporal things and self.

2.

Faith will stagger if the authority of Scriptures staggers.
If faith staggers, charity will stagger.

3.

In keeping with the philosopher's desire to know deep
things, the more difficult the meaning of the passage,
the greater the exegete will appreciate its meaning.

4.

A sign is a thing that causes us to think of something
beyond the impression the thing itself makes upon the
senses.
a.

The Scriptural understanding of numbers frees
the exegete from fateful notions.

b.

An understanding of music is useful for
understanding Scripture.

In keeping with the philosopher's desire to know Truth,
the ecclesiastical exegete and orator should understand that
wherever he may find Truth (scientific truth) it is his Lord's.
1.

The practice of astrology is rooted in anti-Scriptural,
anti-Truth, fate-filled notions.

2.

The Truth of an institution or custom depends
upon common agreement, which may differ from
Scriptural Truth.

xi

D.

3.

As the classical methodology taught logic as a method
of discovering Truth, logical Truth can be found in the
Bible, I Corinthians 15.

4.

A knowledge of Scriptural languages aids in discovering
its truths.

If rhetoric in the classical sense can be used in either urging
evil or justice, why should it not be used in the service of
Truth?
1.

Rhetoric should not be taught per se but should be
caught by reading and hearing eloquence.

2.

The ecclesiastical orator is unaware of his eloquence
but knows the wisdom of Scripture.

3.

The rhetoric used in Scripture doesn't abandon
rhetoric's principles.
a.
b.

Romans 5:3-5
Amos 6:1-6

4.

Augustine finds Cicero's three pronged use of rhetoric
(to teach is a necessity, to please is sweetness, to
persuade is wisdom) useful for teaching Scriptural
truths.

5.

Cicero urged that oratory should vary according to
the subject: small things in a subdued manner,
moderate things in a temperate manner, and grand
things in a grand manner.
a.

Although the ecclesiastical orator has a grand
subject, he speaks it best in a subdued manner.

Xii

6.

b.

Scripture makes use of all three styles. (Matthew
25, Romans 12:6-16, Romans 8:28-39)

c.

Church fathers Cyprian and Ambrose, and even
Augustine, used these styles of oratory.

The ecclesiastical person should aspire to pursue those
truths that are useful.

IV. A summary and some implications for the Lutheran
churchman

Introduction
The Christian Faith and Culture
The tension between the Christian faith and culture in which the
Christian finds himself has been part of the Christian experience ever
since the disciples of the Pharisees came to Jesus and asked, "Tell us then,
what is your opinion? Is it right to pay taxes to Caesar or not" (Mt.
17:22)? Jesus' famous answer demonstrates that the Christian always
lives in two worlds. "Give to Caesar what is Caesar's, and to God what is
God's" (Mt. 17:21).
A survey of the Biblical record will show that the degree to which
the Christian participates in or uses the pagan world may vary. It will
range from quoting a secular poet, as St. Paul does when he quotes the
Cretan poet Epimenides (600 B. C.) in his Cretica to the philosophers on
Mars Hill, "For in him we live, move, and have our being" (Acts 17:28)7,
to the sharp separation from the world that can be found in this passage
from the first letter of St. John, "Do not love the world or anything in
' Robert G.Hoerber, ed. Concordia Self-Study Bible, New International Version. (St.
Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1986), p. 1690. (Other commentaries suggest that
this quote comes from Aratus' (315-240 B. C.) Phaenomena or from Cleanthes (331-233
B.C.) in his Hymn to Zeus. Some attribute the whole passage and the one following in
Acts 17 to Epimenides' epic on Minos and Rhadamanthus. Some doubt whether "in him
we live . . ." is a quotation. And some note that the same thought is found in Psalm 139.

14

the world. If anyone loves the world, the love of the Father is not in him"
(I john 2:15).
The writings of the early church fathers reflect the same tension.
The degree to which the early church fathers made use of or participated
in the pagan world ranged from Tertullian (145 - 220), who, in his tract

de Idololatria ( 221 - 222), denies Christians the right to teach (not to
learn) secular subjects (because the teaching of secular subjects is
absolutely incompatible with the Christian faith and on the level with the
making of idols or of participating in astrology) to Augustine who advises
the aspiring churchman that all truth (whether sacred or secular) is the
Lord's.' In The Confessions, written at the time of the writing of de

Doctrina Christiana, Augustine declares, "He [God] is everywhere where
there is the least trace of truth."' Balanced against these words are
Tertullian's stern words:
Moreover, we must inquire likewise touching
schoolmasters; not only of them, but also all other
professors of literature. Nay, on the contrary, we must
not doubt that they are in affinity with manifold

Augustine, de Doctrina Christiana. Trans. with an intro. by D.W.Robertson, Jr. (New
York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1958), Bk. II, cap. XVIII, p. 54.
8

Augustine, The Confessions of St. Augustine. Trans. by Rex Warner with intro. by
Vernon J. Bourke. (New York: New American Library, 1963), Bk. IV, cap. 12, p. 81.
9

15

idolatry. . . . How do we repudiate secular studies,
without which divine studies cannot be pursued? . . .
Learning literature is allowable for believers, rather
than teaching; for the principles of learning and of
teaching are different. If a believer teach literature,
while he is teaching doubtless he commends, while he
delivers he affirms, while he recalls he bears testimony
to, the praises of idols interspersed therein. . . . Hence
the devil gets men's early faith built up from the
beginnings of their erudition.'
Emperor Julian, the Apostate (360-363), who was a thorough-going
Hellenist and who attempted to reverse the Christian trends of
Constantine and his sons by closing down as many Christian institutions
as possible, forbad Christians on June 17, 360, from teaching in pagan
schools. He felt that when they taught the stories of the Greek and
Roman gods they made a mockery out of what should have been taught
in reverence. _Julian, along with many pagan Roman emperors before
him, was convinced that the worship of the Greek and Roman gods was
what made the Roman Empire great. For Julian the worship of the pagan
gods was at the heart of Rome's glory.
The actual wording of julian's edict said that permission to teach
had to be obtained in advance from the municipal authorities and the
'° Tertullian, de Idololatria. in Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, eds. AnteNicene Fathers, vol. III. Trans. by the Rev. S. Thelwall. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm.
B. Eerdmans Co. 1986), cap. X, pp. 66-67 (Hereafter referrred to as ANF).

16

Emperor himself. This served as a guarantee for the teacher's efficiency
and morality. "Christians who taught Homer and Hesiod without
believing in the gods they described were accused of failing in honesty and
candor by teaching something they did not believe. They were ordered
either to apostatize or to give up teaching.Jill
By inference we can assume that the early church fathers who were
contemporaries of Julian must have not agreed with Tertullian's earlier
mandate. Julian's edict inferred that Christians under his reign taught
pagan subjects. And the history of the early church demonstrated that
Tertullian's view was extreme and difficult to follow. For the greater part.,
the church borrowed from the pagan culture much like the Israelites did
when they took the gold from Egypt before they exited from slavery in
that land."
But what actually was taught to the youthful Christians like _John
Chrysostom or Aurelius Augustine in the pagan schools of Antioch or
Thagaste or Carthage? What world view or weltanschauung was
promoted?

11

How

much could be used and how much needed to be

H. I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity. trans. by. george Lamb. (New

York: Mentor Books, 1956), pp. 430-431.
12

Cf. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine. Bk. II, cap. XL, p. 76.
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discarded in the teaching of the faith? How sharp or how blurred did
Augustine make the separation between the person of faith and the
culture in which that person was found?
These are some of the questions we will raise during this paper. In
order to get at the answer to these questions, we will trace the classical
methodology of education and its curriculum as it expresses the
expectations the Roman culture had for its young. How many of these
expectations would Augustine use in the education of his future
Christians?

After we delineate the classical methodology of

education up until and during Augustine's day, we will seek to discover
the influence of Roman culture's classical methodology of education in
Augustine's de Ordine and de Doctrina Christiana. How much of the
classical Roman educational methodology should the Christian use and
how much should he discard?
As we have already noted, Augustine is not the first early church
father to deal with this tension, but he comes as Eugene Kevane (quoting
Karl jasper) states, at the "Axial Period"" where we find Augustine

Eugene Kevane, Augustine the Educator. (Westminister, Maryland: The Newman
Press, 1964), p. 14. (Kevane quotes Karl Jaspers' The Origin and Goal of History.
[London: Routledge, 1953] p. 26.)

13

18
projecting an "altogether different linear view of history which had been
confined to the chosen people in Palestine during most of the classical
centuries."' We find the prefiguring of this break with ancient classical
thought in the lives and teachings of the early church fathers but it is
given most elaborate expression in Augustine.
The use or discarding the classical method of education can be
already seen in the early church fathers prior to Augustine. Would
Origen (185 - 253) have been effective as a catechist in the city of
Alexandria had he not started a grammar school and been a teacher of
grammar first? Would he later conclude that the work of a catechist was
incompatible with the teaching of grammar?' Would the influential
church father John of Antioch and Constantinople (347 - 407), a
contemporary of Augustine, be known today as the Golden Mouth
(Chrysostom) had he not had the pagan training in rhetoric in the school
of one of Rome's most famous rhetors, the teacher Libanius?16 Would

14

Ibid., p. 22.

15

Ibid.

16

Cf. Philip Schaff, "The Life and Work of St. John Chrysostom" in The Nicene and
Post-Nicene Fathers, vol IX. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmanns Publishing
Co. 1996), p. 6, (Hereafter referred to as "N PN F).

19
Jerome (345 - 420), another contemporary of Augustine, have had an
interest in languages, and, therefore, become skilled enough to translate
the Bible into Latin (The Vulgate) if he had not studied rhetoric (the
most sought after discipline at the time) under Aelius Donatus in
Rome?' Origen's passion for meaning, Chrysostom's passion for
oratory, and Jerome's passion for translating evoke the question, which
liberal arts tools are needed to promote the faith? The tension between
the use or discarding of the classical method of education can be seen in
the classical shadow that haunted _Jerome for most of his life. It was
probably guilt over such fondness for the learning of secular subjects that
drove Jerome, in the midst of a fever-ridden illness and in the midst of an
ascetically enforced Lenten season of 374, to experience the famous antiCiceronian vision. Thereafter, he resolved to stop studying the pagan
writers and devoted himself to sacred studies' And finally, even though
Augustine resigned from his position as a teacher of rhetoric in Milan
after his conversion in 386, how much of the classical methodology of
education would he retain? This paper will show Augustine's use of

Philip Schaff, "Prolegomena to Jerome," NPN F., Second Series, vol. VI. (Grand
Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Erdmanns Publishing Co. 1989), p. xvi.
17

18

Ibid., p. xvii.
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or the discarding of the classical methodology of education in the
training of the churchman of his day. The main focus of inquiry will
be on his two works de Ordine, written after his conversion in 386 and
before his baptism on Easter 387 at the retreat at Cassiciacum, and de
Doctrina Christiana, written ten years after his conversion.

Jerome, who, in spite of his resolve to refrain from reading and
using the pagan writers, later encouraged Magnus, an orator of Rome, to
make use of them.' Chrysostom, who demonstrated his rejection of the
pagan Roman culture by purposefully not mentioning in his sermons and
writings his pagan teacher, Libanius, yet used the arguments of Plato to
prove that the soul of a faithful servant of God is immortal.' Sensing
this tension in the early Church, we can see why the rhetorically and
Platonically-influenced statement of Augustine's that "every good and
true Christian should understand that wherever he may find truth, it is
Ibid., pp. 149 ff. In this letter that is dated A.D. 397, Jerome cites Moses, who
relied upon his Egyptian training; the Book of Proverbs, which commences with dark
sayings that belong by right to the sphere of the dialectician and philosopher; David, who
uses the sword of Goliath to kill him; Hosea, who took a whore, Gomer, to be his wife;
Jewish historian Josephus, who quotes many secular writers; early church father Origen,
who quotes Plato and Aristotle, Numenius and Cornutus; and Cyprian, who wrote with
splendid rhetoric that idols are no gods.
19

zo Chrysostom, "To Prove That No One Can Hann The Man Who Does Not Injure Himself'
in Philip Schaff, ed. N P N F. vol. IX. p. 269 ff. Chrysostom's treatise borrows the
argument that Plato used in his tenth book of The Republic for the immortality of the soul.
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the Lord's"' was a compromise to the tension that had been in the
Christian church since its conception.
The Homeric

Paideia

Kevane stated that "every human culture possesses a distinctive
system and process of education, else it could not live in history for
inability to transmit its essential values to its younger generation.""
What were those essential values in the Greek culture? What was the
proper way of transmitting them? The method of educating was the

paideia

or

humanitas,

"the distinctive classical education which

corresponded to the initiation schools and was the accepted
instrumentality in classical antiquity to teach a boy to become a man."'
Classical education began with Homer. The texts of Homer were
the basic texts. They were poetic. They glamorized the mythical heros
and heroines, gods and goddesses. The poetry's aim was not essentially
aesthetic but the immortalization of the hero. The poet, as Plato was to
say, "clothes all the great deeds accomplished by the men of old with

21

Augustine, Of Christian Doctrine. Bk. II, cap. XVIII, p. 54.

22

Kevane, p. 8.

23

Ibid.
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glory, and thus educated those who come after."' What we have in the
Homeric paideia was not history per se; it was not research into truths,
ethical or metaphysical; it was not totally secular, either; but it was the
promotion of ancient legends which carried with them values that all the
young, through the recitation of Homeric poetry, were taught to imitate
and to model. Here the Greek boys learned what it meant to be free, as
much as one could be free in the fate-filled Greek world, what it meant
to live a morally responsible life, and what it meant to be a complete
Greek man. A major shift in Greek thought came with the dawn of the
philosophical age as expressed in the questioning method of Socrates, the
dialogues of Plato and the writings of Aristotle. The Greek world, and
subsequent Roman world, would not be quite the same after these three
had made their appearance on history's stage.

Yet, through the

subsequent more philosophical centuries, the stories of the escapades
and heroic adventures of the gods and goddesses, mortal heroes and
heroines, lingered on in the schools and the training of the young. A fully
educated young man should know about these things.

24 ibid.

23

The Philosophical and the Rhetorical Classical Traditions
A safe assumption that one can make when doing research in the
classical methodogy of education is that little changed over more than
eight centuries of Roman history. The same curriculum is followed
through the centuries with the end being the Socratic dialogical method
of finding Truth as its highest level of learning. The researcher only has
to examine Augustine's treatise The Teacher (begun during his days at
the Cassiciacum Otium in A. D. 386 - 387 and finished after he moved to
Thagaste, North Africa) to see the relationship between it and Plato's The

Republic completed in 375 B.C. Both works are written around the
Socratic mode of questioning: The Republic between Socrates and his
companions; The Teacher between Augustine and his brilliant illegitimate
son, Adeodatus. Both works celebrate the pursuit of Truth through the
exchange of words in a conversation. Both are attempts to move the
reader to think that reality (res) is beyond what one sees (signum).
Both are convinced that man's rational soul is the connection to Truth.
In Plato's analogy of the cave25 the cave's denizens see only shadows of

Plato, The Republic. Trans. with notes and interpretative essay by Allan Bloom. (New
York: Basic Books Inc., 1968), BK. VII, 514 - 517b, p. 193 if.
25

24

reality until one of them is forced out of the cave into the light of
Truth.' In The Teacher Augustine guides his son out of the signs of this
world into the Light of Christ's truth. Both Plato and Augustine are
moving from the lower to the higher, from that which is seen to that
which is not seen. The difference is that in The Teacher Augustine will
not allow himself to be called the teacher of Truth. "We should not call
any man on earth a teacher." Augustine quotes Matthew 23:9, "There
is One in heaven who is the Teacher of all."'
. .. What is meant by "in heaven" is something that will
be taught by us by Him who directs us even through
human agencies and external signs to turn inwardly to
Him for our instruction. To love Him and to know Him,
that is the happy life, which all proclaim they are
seeking, but few there are who can rejoice at having
really found it. . . . So you [Adeodatus] can see from
whom it was that you learned these things. It was not
from me [Augustine]. But if you did not know that
what I said was true, then neither He nor I have taught
you.28
In The Republic Plato insists that Truth is something discovered

26

Ibid.

Augustine, The Teacher, cap. XIV in The Fathers of the Church, vol 59, trans.
Robert P. Russell. (Washington D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1967),
p. 60.
27

a Ibid.

25
through the exercise of the mind and dialogue. In The Teacher Truth
is something taught by Jesus. But in both the method that Plato had so
successfully borrowed from Socrates is used.
Down through the centuries of Roman history if changes come in
the classical educational methodology, they come slowly. The major
thinkers over the twelve or more centuries that the classical period
extends are easy to name: Plato, Isocrates, Cicero, Augustine. These are
key in understanding the major themes that carry the classical
methodology of education forward until the "Axial Period" of
Augustine."
Plato and the Philosophical Tradition
In Book X of Plato's The Republic he banished the poets (poetry
at the very essence of the Homeric paideia) as a serious detriment for
the Socratic pursuit of the Truth in his Ideal City.' He accused them of
glorifying an imitation of the Greek heroes and heroines. They aroused
the passions and do not lead to what was just and noble, good and
beautiful. They were used later to glorify and at the same time to mock

29

Kevane, p. 22.

30

Plato, The Republic. Bk. X, 595a - 608a, pp. 277ff.

26
the gods and goddesses in the Roman theatres. These were the very
gods and goddesses that any conservative, pagan Roman citizen would
say made Rome great.
It was Ellpersmann's point that even after Christianity had become
the official religion of the Roman Empire, the catholic church did not set
up its own schools of learning. This was something we would think she
would have done after the pagan rule of Julian, the Apostate 31 Instead
what the catholic church did was to allow its members to attend the
pagan schools in which the classical methodology of education was
employed and the liberal arts were taught. Here the classical poets
were read, the refined techniques of rhetoric were practiced, and the
philosophical methods of dialectics were mastered.

Having been

schooled in this classical methodology, the student was equipped to
make his contribution to the catholic, Roman society. The same
expectations were demanded of the pagan student, except that he did
not recognize Jesus as the teacher of Truth.
These schools, for Marrou, were not

separated from the

Gerard Ellspermann, Attitude of Early Christian Latin Writers Toward Pagan_
Literature and Learning. (Washington D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press,
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Hellenistic culture. They were expressions of it. The best of what one
found in these schools one found in the Roman culture. A civilization
must achieve its true form before it can create the education in which
it was reflected. "Classical education did not attain its own distinctive
form until after the great epoch of Greek civilization. We have to wait
until the Hellenistic era before we find it in full possession of its specific
forms, its own curricula and methods."'
Isocrates' School and the Rhetorical Tradition
Another of Marrou's points was that by the time the youthful
Augustine went to the schools in Carthage, rhetoric had overtaken
philosophy as the all-inclusive discipline. By the end of the fourth
century it was far more worthwhile to master rhetoric's refined
techniques than to become a master of the Socratic dialogue. If we
don't grasp this shift in emphasis in the classical methodology of
education, we will fail to grasp the change that occurred in Augustine's
life at his conversion and yet the need to retain the place of rhetoric's
tools in the proclaimation of the truths of the Scripture.
The Athenian, Isocrates, 436-338 B.C., was the founder of the

32 Marrou, p. xiii.

28
rhetorical school which soon came into competition with the more
philosophic Platonic schools for the minds of the Greek youth.
. . . two forms of culture are typified by Plato and
Isocrates: the philosophical and the rhetorical. Of
these the dominant member was unquestionably the
second, which left a profound impression on all
manifestation of the Hellenistic spirit. For the very
great majority of students, higher education meant
taking lessons from the rhetor, learning the art of
eloquence from him. (As John Chrysostom had done
from Libaniusi The fact must be emphasized from the
start. On the level of history Plato had been defeated:
posterity had not accepted his educational ideas. The
victor, generally speaking was Isocrates, and Isocrates
became the educator first of Greece and then of the
whole ancient world. His success had already been
evident when the two were alive, and it became more
and more marked as the generations wore on. Rhetoric
is the specific object of Greek education and the
highest Greek culture.'

What made Plato's academy so foreboding to many was that he
demanded of his students a series of studies so complex and difficult
that most students did not complete them. All this he did under the
illusion that perfect wisdom and perfect knowledge could be known
about all things, and subjects that distracted from the pursuit of this
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pure knowledge were banished from the city.
. . . we know that Plato was violently critical of the
poets who in his own time were considered classics-especially Homer: but his criticism went beyond the
tragic poets to the part played by myths generally in
the traditional education of Greek children. . . . Plato
condemned the poets because their myths were lies
giving a false picture of the gods and heroes and one
that was unworthy of their perfection. The poets' art,
being a product of illusion, was pernicious because it
was inconsistent with Truth--to which all education
should be subordinated--and because it distracted the
mind from its proper end-- the attainment of rational
knowledge."
Plato's concern for Truth posed the question whether the goal of
education should be artistic and poetic or truth-seeking and scientific.
The question lingered on though, and both expressions were seen in the
writings of Augustine.
It was Isocrates and his school of rhetoric, on the other hand, that
opposed Plato's concern for pure Truth. Platonic Truth wasn't practical,
thought Isocrates. In the area of human affairs of what to do and what
to say, for example, there can never be a precise science. `The 'genuinely
cultivated' man-- ritrra i 6 cuuevoc-- says Isocrates, is not the man who
knows pure Truth but is the kind of person who has a gift for 'hitting

" Ibid., p. 109.
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upon' the right solution or at least the solution that is most nearly right,
61 1 Pos. and this is because he has the
the best in the circumstances-- IC_
right 'opinion' —6,00.'5
In The Republic Plato dismissed "doxa"-- the popular opinion that
the masses agreed upon-- as being the opposite of wonder. It was this
"wonder" (Augustine called it "longing" or "yearning") that was for Plato
the beginnings of the philosopher king but for Augustine the beginnings
of the godly happy man or woman. For 'example, the person who saw
beyond the cock fight to a similarity in the way all cocks fight" or who
saw beyond the graceful movements of a dancer-- to Beauty, was the
person who longed for [wondered about] God.37 For Plato this gift of
wonder and the exercise of reason was the beginning of Wisdom and the
discovery of the Highest Good. The pursuit of Plato's long-sought-after
wisdom of justice, for which all of his students strove, ended up in no
real city, for Plato's city was a city of ideas, a dream city. For Augustine
the pursuit of the happy life (beata vita) ended up in a real city, the City
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of God.
For Isocrates Plato's concerns did not take care of immediate,
practical concerns. These could best be handled through the gift of
polished oratory.
In the real city on earth, as Julian the Apostate, who modeled his
emperorship after Platonic principles, found out, the philosopher king
was an object of ridicule. His city eventually met with failure because
ridicule could have been a reason for his death." "There was no point in
attempting to mount into the heavens of Ideas or in playing about with
paradoxes: for the purpose of living properly what we need was not new
and surprising ideas but established good sense, traditional wisdom.""
What Isocrates tried to foster in his disciples was the ability to make
decisions, a type of intuitive grasp of the complexity of human affairs and
a perception of the imponderable of human affairs.4° For him there
became a connection between rhetoric and morals. The intimate bond
between form and content was inseparable. This demanded a sensitivity

. 38 Lebanius, Lebanius Selected Works, vol. I, trans., intro., and notes by A. F. Norman.
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 285.
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of thought and a sense for different meanings, that was difficult to
express in conceptual ideas. These were the things that the poets make
you feel, the very poets that Plato wanted to expel from his city. Science
and the search for Truth can never attain this. "The result is that an
`oratorical' kind of education, which in appearance is entirely a matter of
aesthetics, whose one aim is to create 'wizards with words,' is in fact the
most effective way of developing subtlety of thought.' For Augustine
it became not only a means of making a living but also a means of
teaching young people the skills that led toward the emptiness of vain
glory.
Isocrates' Academy was practical. He, too, educated his students
for the political life, "preferring to teach them to be able to form sensible
opinions about things that were useful rather than spend time in hairsplitting about points that were utterly useless."'
Cicero's Hortensius
Nearly four centuries before Augustine and four centuries after
Isocrates, Cicero (106-43 B.C.) sensed one reason the Roman Empire
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(which he loved so much and fought to keep alive) was dying was because
the teaching of rhetoric and the practice of it led to so little Truth. He
felt that the reason we, as human beings, had an advantage over brute
creatures or barbarians was that we can reproduce our thoughts in
words, both written and oral. This culture of the word, since the days of
Plato, had led humanity out of its brutish barbarian existence to the
cultured Roman condition of having educated citizens. This culture of the
word, the logos, must be first and foremost a philosophical culture of
Truth. This must not degenerate into a development of mere powers of
speech and persuasion, divorced from content and substance and Truth.'
"This basic concept of human excellence ran through Cicero's
philosophical and educational works like a gold thread, seeking to bind the
Roman world with its native virtue to the best in Greek heritage of

paidela."44
Ten years after his conversion and some twenty-two years after
this recorded encounter with Cicero's Hortensius, Augustine wrote in
Book III of his Confessions--
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Among such companions in this unsettled age of
mine I pursued my studies of the books of eloquence,
a subject in which I longed to make my name for
myself, though my reason for this was damnable and
mere wind, being simply joy in human vanity. In the
normal course of study I came across a book by Cicero,
a man whose style, though not his heart, is almost
universally admired. This book of his contains an
exhortation to philosophy; it is called Hortensius. Now
it was this book which altered my way of feeling,
turned my prayers to you, Lord, yourself, and gave me
different ambitions and desires. Every vain hope
suddenly became worthless to me; my spirit was filled
with an extraordinary and burning desire for the
immortality of wisdom, and now I began to rise, so that
I might return to you. I was in my nineteenth year
(my father having died two years previously), and I
might be assumed to be spending money my mother
sent on sharpening my tongue; but it was not for the
purpose of sharpening my tongue that I had used this
book of Cicero's; what moved me was not the style, but
the matter.
I was on fire then, my God, I was on fire to leave
earthly things behind and fly back to you, nor did I
know what you would do with me; for with you is
wisdom. But that book inflamed me with the love of
wisdom (which is called "philosophy" in Greek).'
Such an influence had this book on Augustine, that after his conversion and before his baptism, at his retirement and place of therapy,
Cassiciacum, he insisted that those with him read it. "It produced in them

' Augustine, The Confessions of Saint Augustine. Trans. by Edward B. Pusey, intro. by
Harold C. Gardiner. ( New York: Washington Square Press, Inc., 1964), Bk. III, cap. IV,
p. 56.
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a part of the effect of which the saint desired.' Retiring from the vain
pursuits of teaching the hollow principles of rhetoric, Augustine
consciously worked out his Christian educational philosophy. He echoed
Plato when he showed concern that Licentius, his prize student, spent too
much time with poetry.' What separated Augustine's educational goals
from the pagan educational goals of his time was his quest for Wisdom
and Truth and the Highest Good. The absence of these forced him to
resign from the school of rhetoric. The resultant modifications of these
will be seen in his de Ordine and de Doctrina Christiana. They can be
seen in his plea to put all truth in service to the Lord.
The Classical Weltanschauung before Augustine
During the centuries preceding Augustine, the Roman outlook on
life which overrode all of life, including the worship of the Roman gods
and the goals of the classical methodology of education, was the deeply
embedded notion of Moira or fate. This was expressed poignantly in the
philosophical systems of Stoicism and Epicureanism. They responded to
the deep--seated convictions within Greek and Roman cultures and
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concluded that the tragic and fateful happenings in life had no real
answer. The mature Hellenistic person did what he could with what was
sure to come. The Stoics promoted emotional restraint. The Epicureans
promoted licentious living within limits. Platonism and Neo-Platonism did
not do a much better job in giving an answer to Moira. Their answer
appealed to the immortality of the immaterial soul and stated that evil
was not a substance, as Manichaeism insisted, but a "turning away into
separateness: its very existence assumed the existence of an order . . . .
It was the self-willed part that was diminished, by losing contact with
something bigger and more vital than itself.' That which is the "bigger
and more vital" is the One, Unchangeable God who encompassed all
change and all evil, too.
For, Plotinius' universe was a continuous, active
whole, which could not admit brutal cleavages and no
violent irruptions. Each being in it drew strength and
meaning from its dependence on this living continuum.
Evil, therefore, was only a turning away into
separateness: its very existence assumed the existence
of an order, which was flouted while remaining no less
real and meaningful. It was the self-willed part that
was diminished by losing contact with something bigger
and more vital than itself."
48
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But reading the panergyrics of Libanius (especially his neverdelivered panergyric after the sudden death of his hero, Julian, the
Apostate), we sense a defensiveness and a self-justification against the
harshness of life in his times. This could explain why rhetoric, which had
refined its techniques over the centuries since the days of Isocrates,
becomes the chief means of defense against a harsh, cruel Roman world.
We find that rhetoric becomes a means of self-glorification and selfpromotion, yea even a means of giving to another, especially at the time
of death, immortality. But behind the persuasive words of the speaker
of a panergyric at a Roman funeral is the notion that fate (moira) has
once again prevailed. Fate is stronger than the great Roman gods that
the young learned about in the grammar schools; it is more pervasive
than philosophy, which the thinkers of the day are disciplined in; and
even the best orator would fall victim to it. Its end is to return all things
from which they came. Kevane calls it "the myth of the eternal return".'
Kevane read this already in Plato's Phaedrus.
. . . we find that the cyclic doctrine lies at the very root
of his theory of knowledge based on pre-existence and
5° Kevane, p. 11. Kevane quoting from B. Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, vol. HI.
(New York: Bigelow and Brown), pp. 405-6. [Plato writes of this in chapter 57 of
Paedo].
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thus becomes the foundation of his paideia of
reminiscence. `For the revolution of the spheres.' he
writes, 'carries the immortal souls around, and they
behold the world beyond . . . And the intelligent soul .
.. feeding upon the sight of truth is replenished, until
the revolution of the world brings her round again to
the same place.' Plato at times speaks of fate in terms
.51
of an iron necessity, .
In the eyes of many weak Roman Christians, Christianity, too, fell
under the power of Moira. Such was the conclusion of the proud Roman
citizens who saw their beloved, and once proud, city of Rome fall to the
Vandals under the leadership of Alaric in 410. Such was the report of the
refugees who fled to North Africa to speak to Augustine in Hippo. They
longed for the old days when the Roman gods were worshiped, for it
seemed to them that it was Christianity's fault that their beloved Rome
had fallen to ruin. They longed to return to their deep-seated Roman
conservativism when the Roman gods, who seemed to be in control, still
ruled. They, with their pagan relatives and neighbors were saying, "if
Rome had not turned into Christianity officially, this disaster would not
have happened." Under all their pleading words was the conviction that
fate (Moira) had a way of bringing the worst to the best. We found in
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Augustine's Christian educational writings a powerful philosophical and
theological antidote to their fate-filled perception of history.
The Classical Educational Curriculum
To see how the classical methodology of education impacted
Augustine's answer, a review of its curriculum will be helpful for our
purposes. As we have already stated, the classical education methodology
did not change much from the time of Plato to Augustine, some eight
hundred years. The following was Ellspermann's description of the
classical curriculum.
At the age of twelve the boy was sent to the
grammaticus. Along with purely grammatical studies,
punctuation and accent for the purpose of speaking
and writing correctly in Greek and Latin, poetry was
thoroughly studied. In Greek, Homer came first.
Other poets were Hesiod, the dramatists, and the lyric
writers in selections. Quintilian thought it best to
begin with Vergil. Besides Vergil, the other Latin poets
chiefly read were Livius Andronicus, Ennius, Plautius,
Terence, Horace, Lucan and Statius. In connection with
detailed explanation of the poets, the grammaticus
gave his students lectures on metre, poetry in general,
mythology, philosophy, astronomy, history, or music.
Thus a general education was obtained. Here, too,
many selections from the poets were committed to
memory, and there was much practice in verse making.
The poets then, were the first main object of study. As
exercises in prose, the young students reproduced
stories in their own words, turned poetry into prose.
Pupils who were not to go further in their studies, i. e.,
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to the rhetor, were given a training in elementary
rhetoric. They thus completed "orbis ille doctrinae
, 33
quam Graeci EyKIJKA LOV naL5E Lary vocanr
The crown of Roman education was rhetoric (at least
by the late fourth century), or the art and practice of
public speaking. The Roman youth entered the school
of rhetoric when he was sixteen years old. Here he
read the historians and orators, and the reading was
accompanied by the study of technicalities of style as
exhibited in the works of the masters or oratory and
prose. The principal aim of the rhetor was to make a
man able to speak correctly. Written exercises,
discourses, refutations, panegyrics, and development of
matters of common knowledge first rendered the
faculties supple. The rhetor then employed his student
in declamation proper, making him deliver an
exposition on some subject, such as a case of
conscience or a fictitious suit. The emphasis was on
form; the matter or content was more or less
indifferent. Declamation, introduced into Rome about
84 B.C. became the supreme test and crowning exercise
in rhetoric, success in which was the ambition of pupils
and the pride of their parents. Declamations were
classed as suasoriae, where a certain course of action
was debated; and as controversiae, where some point
was affirmed or denied. The training under the rhetor
was designed to equip pupils for the vocations of public
life--for deliberative and forensic oratory. Such
exercises, incredible though the situations might be,
imparted through the mental gymnastics involved a
nimbleness of mind, a quickness in propounding an
argument, a versality in treatment, and a finish in
speech, almost amazing. Though such a system has
obvious advantages, yet from a practical standpoint it
could be empty, puerile, vain, lacking virility and
seriousness. The range was narrow and unreal;
threadbare themes were discussed. Hence arose the
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far-fetched absurdities with which the declamations
abound."
II
The Classical Methodology of Education in de Ordine
Unlikely as it may seem, Augustine's Christian educational
philosophy answered for him the central issues of life: does the order of
God's providence embrace everything good and evil? If God created all
things good, where did evil come from? Was evil there from all eternity?
Or did evil begin in time? These questions plagued him all his life from
the time he joined the Manichean sect during his school days in Carthage
until he wrote the last chapters of his seminal defense for the Christian
faith, Concerning The City of God against the Pagans after the downfall
of the city of Rome. One could guess that Augustine was thinking of the
same theological problem years later when the Vandals began to ransack
his city of Hippo during the year of his death 430.
We will consider in depth de Ordine, and we will find that the goal
Augustine has in mind for the well-trained godly man was that he should
see beyond the catastrophes and tragedies and changes of life to a greater
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and deeper plan of God. By searching his soul (something which
Augustine felt few in his day did) and discovering God behind the order
to all things, Augustine's student would be led to live the happy life,

Beata vita.
The chief cause of this error is that man knows not
Now for acquiring this self-knowledge, he
himself.
needs a constant habit of withdrawing from things of
the senses and of concentrating his thoughts within
himself, and holding it there. This they alone succeed
in doing, who definitely mark out in solitude the
impressions of opinion which the course of daily life
has made, or correct them by means of the liberal
branches of learning."
At the end of this educational piece, written in dialogue form,
Augustine wrote poetically out of pure excitement over what the soul
discovers when it withdraws from the sensual experience and
contemplates God.
But when the soul has properly adjusted and disposed
itself and has rendered itself harmonious and beautiful,
then it will venture to see God (audebit jam Deum
videre), the very source of all truth and the very
Father of Truth. 0 great God, What kind of eyes shall

" Augustine, de Ordine. Bk. I, cap. I, par. III, pp. 10-11. Cujius erroris maxima
causa est, quod homo sibi ipse est incognitus. Qui tames at se noscat,
magna opus habet consuetudine recedendi a sensibus et animum is seipsum
colligendi atque in seipso retinendi. Quod ii tantum asseqiiuntur, qui plagas
quasdam opinionum, quas vitae quotidianae cursus infligit, aut solitudine inurunt aut
liberalibus medicant disciplinis.
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those be! How pure! How beautiful! How powerful!
How constant! How serene! God blessed! And what is
that which they see! (Quid aurem est illud quod
vident?) What is it? I ask? (Quid, quaeso?) What
should we surmise? What should we believe? What
should we say?
Everyday expressions present
themselves, but they have been rendered sordid by
things of least worth. I shall say no more, except that
to us is promised a vision of beauty (nisi promitti nobis
aspectum pulchritudinus)--the beauty of whose
imitation all other things are beautiful, and by
comparison with which all other things are beautiful in
comparison with which all other things are unsightly.
Whoever will have glimpsed this beauty--and he will see
it, who lives well, prays well, studies well (videbit

aurem qui bene vivit, bene orat, bene studet).54
As we can see Augustine's educational goals, though highly
influenced by the impractical concerns of Plato's world of ideas, are
applied to practical concerns of the inconsistencies of life that Romans
experienced in the late fourth century.
How will it ever trouble him why another man, desiring
to have children, has them not (cur alius optans
habere filos non habeat), while another man casts out
his own offspring as being unduly numerous; why one
man hates children before they are born, and another
man loves them after birth; or how it is not absurd
that nothing will come to pass which is not with God-and therefore it is inevitable that all things come into
being in accordance with order--and nevertheless God
is not petitioned in vain? (Ex quo necesse est ordine
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omina fieri et tamen non frustra Deum rogari?)55
Augustine's well-trained man is a tranquil, happy person who has
learned to look beyond the changes, tragedies, inconsistencies and
injustices in life to the whole of life.

Finally, how will any burdens, dangers, scorns, or smiles
of fortunes disturb a just man? In this world of sense
it is indeed necessary to examine carefully what time
and place are, so that what delights in a portion of
place and time, may be understood to be far less
beautiful than the whole of which it is a portion. And
furthermore, it is clear to the learned man that what
displeases in a portion, displeases for no other reason
than because the whole with which that portion
harmonizes wonderfully, it is not seen; but that in the
intelligible world, every part is as beautiful and perfect
as the whole. (In illo vero mundo intelligibili,

quamliber pat-tern, tanquam totum, pulchram esse
atque perfectum.76
What did the life of one who followed the prescriptions of Augustine
look like?

After the godly person has gone through Augustine's

curriculum, how shall he live? Augustine's expectations were quite clear.
He wrote, "Youth devoted to this science ought

studiosis) . . . "
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1) to live so as to refrain from all wantonness, from
the enticement of gluttony, from excessive care and
adornment of the body, from silly practices of games,
from dullness of sleep and sloth, from jealousy,
detraction, and envy, from the ambition for honor and
power, and from the unrestrained desire of praise.
2) to be convinced that the love of money is an
unfailing poison for all their hopes. (Amorem aurem

pecuniae totius suae spei certissimum venenum esse
credant).
3) to do nothing half-heartedly, nothing rashly. In case
of faults of their associates, let them either cast out all
anger, or so restrain it that it will be like anger
dismissed. Let them hate no one. (Neminem oderint).
4) not to be unwilling to correct vices. (Nulla vitia
non curare velint.) Let them take care especially not
to be excessive in vengeance or stinting in forgiveness.
5) [to] punish only what can be improved, (Nihil
puniant quod non valeat ad melius) and favor nothing
that may become worse.
6) [to] regard their own fellowmen and all those over
whom authority has been given to them respectfully.
Let them be so obedient that it would be embarrassing
to give them commands, and let them rule so
considerably that it becomes a pleasure to obey them.
7) not to be troublesome to one who is reluctant.
8) [to] avoid enmities, bear them patiently, and end
them most speedily.
9) to observe this one familiar proverb: not to do to
anyone what they would not have done to themselves.
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(Nemini faciant quod pati nolunt).
10) not . . . to undertake the administration of the
State unless they are matured. (Republican non

administrare, nisi perfecti).
11) not [to] think himself (those who turn to these
studies late in life) bound by no other precept, in fact,
he will all the more easily observe those things in
mellowed age.
12) [to] have friends in all circumstances in life.
13) [to] live in a fitting and decent manner, supported
by faith, hope and love, let them have God the object
of their worship, their thinking, and their serving.

(Deum colant cogitant quaeranl fide, spe, charitate
subnixi.).
14) [to] desire tranquility, and a definite course for
their own studies and for those of all their associates
and for themselves and for whomsoever else such
things are possible, a good and quiet life. (Et sibi

quibusque possunt mentem bonam pacatamque
vitam).57
Can There Be a Perceived Order of Reality?
The purpose of recording the discourse at the baths of Cassiciacum
between newly converted Augustine and his group of companions
(Alypius, Navigius, Licentius, and Trygetius) and his mother, Monica was
to develop an answer of how one reached these goals in a world filled with
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change, discouragements, and evil. Could these things have happened by
chance? Could it even be possible that God willed them? Or was there
a deeper plan, that most do not sense, by which all things were arranged
and under God's Providence?
Licentius, the son of Augustine's benefactor, Romanianus, played
the most dominant role in the dialogue, perhaps because he, above all the
rest, was fascinated by and indulged in the writing of poetry, an activity
that Plato, as we have noted, opposed in Bk X of

The Republic.'

It was

Licentius that Augustine wanted to instruct by means of dialogue to
become the wise, godly man who could transcend the many assaults on
the Christian's life to live the happy life, beata vita. By addressing the
whole work to little-known Zenobius," a secretary in the imperial
government,

a magister memoriae, we sensed that Augustine intended

his work to have a far--reaching impact upon Roman life. By addressing
Zenobius, Augustine demonstrated that he was a total Roman citizen

ss Plato, The Republic. Bk. X 595a - 608, p. 429. [In his interpretative essay Allan Bloom
goes to great length to explain why Plato banished the poets from his ideal city.]
" Augustine, de Ordine. p. 181. The footnote mentions that the only other sources of
information that refer to Zenobius are found in two of Augustine's letters. In one of these
letters we discover that he had been made a magister memoriae, i.e., a secretary in the
imperial government.
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because his educational vision, found in de Ordine, was thoroughly
immersed in the Roman culture, yet Christian.
At the outset Augustine declared his statement of purpose, "to
perceive and to grasp the order of reality proper to each thing, and then
to see or to explain the order of the entire universe by which this world
is truly held together and governed--that, Zenobius, is a very difficult and
rare achievement for men."' Augustine knew that most people do not
spend time doing the thing that he has set his group to do. It called for
his participants to ponder (curae)61 or to care about these matters, for
it can only be done by those who marvel or wonder Onirabilisr about
things. These people were truly rare. Once one wondered about what
has been set forth by Augustine one became aware that his problem has
many aspects to it, for mere observation of the events of the Roman
world will lead one to the conclusion that "either divine Providence did
not reach to the outer limits of things or that surely all evils were
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committed by the will of God." (aut certe mala omnia Del voluntate
committi)"
Even a human being was not held responsible for what he could not
do or prevent. How could God? But if one said that there was no order
to things, then one would have to say that either things occur by chance
or were not part of the effect of a design or were not part of the hidden
control of divine majesty.
In leading his group of vacation retreaters to a satisfying answer to
the problem he posed, Augustine wanted Licentius to be committed to the
conviction about order, which he did on the morning after the beginning
of the discourse. Licentius' definition was "Order is that by which are
governed all things that God has constituted."64
But before Augustine led Licentius to this conclusion he appealed
to him about a common annoyance that he cannot explain--his
sleeplessness caused by an irregular water fall. "I was awake, therefore,
as I said, when the sound of water flowing past at the rear of the baths
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came to my ears; and it was noticeably louder than usual."' Driven by
the gift of wonder, Augustine asked, "What was its cause?" Licentius, who
was also awake, working on his poetry, was frightened by some mice.
What were the reasons for these occurrences? Was it the leaves that fell
into the spring that back-up the stream that caused the water to flow
irregularly? What was it that caused Licentius to respond to his muse,
Calliope?" By these Socratic questions Augustine drew out of Licentius
the longing to care about and ponder over the deeper things, the
philosophical things, and nudged him away from his poetic flights to think
about the problem Augustine has set before him. Being a thinking man,
Licentius concluded, "nothing is done apart from order."' Licentius was,
as Plato had once strongly urged, moved away from things poetic to seek
the Truth in these matters, and he concluded that it was a higher pursuit
than what a soothsayer did when predicting the future on the basis of
what a mouse did.68 "For Philosophy--as I have begun to believe as you
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prove it day by day--is our true and tranquil abode" (Vera et inconcussa
nostra

habitatio).' From then on he was convinced that he would defend

order in all things (ordinem rerum)7° He then made his commitment to
order even deeper by stating "that even though someone were to worst
me in this debate, I should attribute even that fact to the order of things,
and not to reasonless chance."'
Augustine moved the discussion further by posing to Licentius
whether order was either good or bad and whether there can be anything
that is opposite of order. "Nothing" (NihiO "how indeed can anything be
opposed to that which has seized and held the whole?"' "Then can error
be opposed to order?" Trygetius asked. Licentius was equally as adamant
as before.
Not at all; Licentius replies. For I see that no one goes
wrong without a cause. Moreover, the series of causes
is contained in order, and error not only arises from a
cause, but it gives origin to something else of which it
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is itself the cause. Wherefore, insomuch as it is not
apart from order, so neither can it be opposed to
order. Quamobrem quo extra ordinem non est eo non

potest ordini esse contrarius."
Augustine sensed now that Licentius, with his firm defense of order
was becoming like a dear son of his, because, even though Augustine had
lost hope in him with regards to the lower branches (mediocres litteras)
of learning, now he was into the very heart of philosophy (in mediam

venire philosophiam).

Like a true Platonist who responded to an idea

just because it was an idea, Licentius exclaimed. "Both good and bad
things are in order." (et bona et mala in ordine sunt)74
Trygetius is not so easily convinced, "what more impious statement
could be made than that evil things themselves are comprised in order;
for surely God loves order." (Certe enim Deus amat ordinemr
Licentius agrees but wonders whether it then follows that evils come from
God and that God even loves evils. (Ex quo sequitur ut et mala sint a

summo Deo et mala Deus diligat) i6
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It is now Augustine's turn to insert his wisdom.
And he greatly loves order precisely because by
it he loves not evils. But how can evils themselves be
"not in order," although God does not love them? Now
this itself is the order of evils: that they be not loved
by God. And does this order of things seem to you
unimportant that God loves things good and does not
love things evil? And thus evil which God does not
love, are not apart from order; and nevertheless He
does love order itself. This very thing he loves: to love
good things, and not to love bad things--and this itself
is a thing of magnificent order and of divine
arrangement. "
What the reader of this discourse should sense by now is that
Augustine has really two orders (ordines) in mind. The first is order,
the sequence, of events in life, including both good and evil events; but he
also has in mind an educational sequence by which the student is
equipped to grasp that all events in life are held together in a whole. But
Augustine seems to suggest that one has to be willing to pursue Truth in
a Platonic, dialectic manner in order to grasp this. Only a few are
capable of doing this, but the pursuit and the ends to which it leads--to
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to know the Highest Good, the Truth, the Whole, the Unchangeable and
the Beautiful--makes for the wise person of God. In longing for and
seeking this Highest Good, Augustine appeals to the Platonic school of
thought and rejects the rhetorical school of thought that had occupied
his youthful life for the twelve years before he sought a retreat at
Cassiciacum.
The following morning, with a clear mind, Augustine concludes,
Order is that which will lead to God, if we hold to it
during life; and unless we do hold to it during life, we
shall not come to God. And if I am not deceived by my
affection for you, we now believe and hope that we
shall come to God. Most carefully, therefore, ought
this question to be resolved and worked out by us.78

Now Augustine moves his companions, although Alypius and Navigius
have gone off to Milan, to the point where he wants them and he moves
us the readers, too, to go beyond what we sensually experience to wonder
about what our senses inform us. But he concludes that it is not wise to
push the issue any further, lest, while Augustine longs to teach order, he
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should "exceed moderation, the parent of order."' The comment, which
appears near the end of the educational piece, reminds one of Aristotle's
Golden Mean in his

Nicomachean Ethics.

"Now it [virtue,

arete] is a

means between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which
depends on defect; and again it is a means because the vices respectively
fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions, while
virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate."'
He concludes at one point that it is even by this order that the
great God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit has "for our sake deigned to take
up and dwell in this body of our own kind, yet the more lowly it appears,
so much more it is replete with clemency and the farther and the wider
remote form a certain characteristic pride of ingenious men.""

(ingeniosorum superbia)82
By the "ingenious men" Augustine means the Platonists. Augustine
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can agree with them on many points--the gift of wonder, the ascendance
to God by the perceptions of the soul, the Socratic questionings of what
the senses grasp, and a dialectical process of a group like the one at
Cassiciacum who seeks the Truth behind all things; but he cannot, and
they will not, agree with him concerning the incarnation of God. This
the Platonists cannot fathom. How could the One, the Highest Good, the
Wisdom, the Truth, or the Logos become flesh? Over this central
Christian teaching Augustine separates himself from the Platonists."
"Therefore, God is governed, says Trygetius. What of
it?" he replies. "Do you not admit that Christ is God,
Who came to us by way of order, and says that he was
sent by God the Father? If therefore God sent us
Christ by way of order, and we admit that Christ is
God, the God not only governs all things, but Himself
is governed by order. 84
Are there events that are outside God's order? Can things happen

pp. 184-185. Russell states that it is evident that this notion
83 Augustine, de Ordine.
precluded not only the fact but even the possibility of the Incarnation when the Son of
God assumed complete human nature in the unity of the Divine Person. This Augustine
found incompatible with revealed truth. Other errors he found among the Platonist were
a) that the world came into being necessarily and by a process of emanation; b) the
doctrine of the transmigration of souls; c) the eternal duration of the world.
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by chance? Does God will evil? All these are not possible if order, the
order that God governs, is behind everything. Evil itself can not destroy
order nor can it be outside of order, but God includes it in his order.
The Role of the Senses
What is the role of man's senses in pursuing order?

Do they

deter or do they aid in attaining the Truth about order or do they
detract? The two human senses that Augustine deals with are the sense
of seeing, through which we detect movement and colors, and the sense
of hearing, through which we detect sounds. It is by way of the sense of
hearing that the waterfall, near where Augustine and his companions are
asleep, leads them into a discussion on order. Most people would merely
hear the waterfall. They would not ask what made it flow irregularly, and
therefore keeps Augustine awake. Augustine's opinion of those who live
only by their senses can be compared to the people who are chained and
shackled to the far side of the cave wall in Plato's analogy of the cave.'
They see flickering images against the cave wall of the images that the
people on the parapet behind them carry back and forth. "They live
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wretched lives, but they live.' Their existence is similar to that of a
slave. They are slaves to the images that their senses perceive and to the
opinions (doxa) of others. They lack the gift of wonder and the mind
that questions. Living by the perceptions of the soul, on the other hand,
one lives not merely to exist but one lives a happy life, (sed beate vivere
satis sit).87
Knowledge gained only by the senses is a knowledge of the lowest
form for a human being. The acquisition of this knowledge is necessary
for the development of the wise, godly person. It does not, however, lead
him to be with God nor even to know himself. These two are essential
for Augustine, but the education that comes through the senses is
necessary for one's complete education." ". . . whoever knows only those
things which the senses reach, seems to me to be not only not with God,
but not even with himself.' This is the error of errors in the Greek
world, as the Greek tragic dramatists would over and over point out. Lack
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of self-awareness brought the hero to a tragic end. This sends the tragic
Greek hero to the oracle at Delphi to hear and read the ancient truth,
"Know Thy Self." The Greek tragic dramatists tell stories of the
harshness of Greek life.
But the perception of the senses is necessary, for Augustine. One
cannot live in this world without the use of them. There are even traces
of reason in the senses. One may be drawn away from more important
matters to watch the bitter fight of two irrational cocks. This often
happens in life. The senses perceive the bright colors of the two cocks,
their irregular movements and the final outcome of their fight. These
sense observations are needed before reason, the mind, and the soul can
ask questions like, why do all cocks act similarly? What is common to all
cock fights? Why do cocks fight for dominance over their hens?' But if
the questions are not asked and the possible answers are not discussed in
a dialectical manner, the spectators who observe the fight are no better
than the people who are shackled to the far side of Plato's cave. Seven
centuries before Augustine's Cassiciacum retreat Plato has Socrates ask
9° Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition. (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books,
1958), p. 158.
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of Glaucon,
Isn't this at last the song itself that dialectic performs?
It is in the realm of the intelligible, but it is imitated by
the power of sight. We said that sight at last tries to
look at the animals themselves and at the stars
themselves and then finally at the sun itself. So, also
when a man tries by discussion-- by means of argument
without the use of any of the senses--to attain to each
thing itself that is and doesn't give up before he grasps
by intellect itself that which is good itself, he comes to
the very end of the intelligible realm just as that other
man was then at the end of the visible.'

People who only live by their senses and the agreed upon opinion
(doxa) of others will only live in the realm of the visible. They are chained
to this life. They are shackled from seeing what the soul can perceive
and to what the intellect can grasp. In the cruel, indifferent Roman
world that Augustine lived, they will be confused and disappointed by the
changes of life and end up complaining about God.93 "Thus it happens
that whoever narrow-mindedly considers this life by itself alone, is
repelled by its enormous foulness, and turns away in sheer disgust.'
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The soul is our next topic in understanding more thoroughly
Augustine's educational principles. The soul according to Augustine
naturally seeks unity in all things. The very Latin word for soul, anima,
is closely linked to unum or one.
The soul returned to itself in this manner, understands
(quae sit
what is the beauty of the universe;
pulchritudo universitatis intelligit) this term is
evidently derived from the word unum (one).
Wherefore, the beholding of oneness is not granted to
that soul (animae) which wanders toward many objects
and eagerly pursues mental beggary, which though it
does not know it, can only be avoided by keeping aloof
from the multitude; and I mean, not just the multitude
of men, but all things that the senses reach.

Multitudinem autem non hominum dico, sed omnium
quae sensus attingit.'
Augustine's Personal Journey to Faith Seeks Wholeness
Having been influenced indirectly by the life and practices of the
most extreme ascetic of his times, Anthony in Egypt," Augustine's
Christian conversion draws him away from the things of this world. The
garden outside of the house where Alypius and he are staying in Milan
and the words of the child repeating his Latin phrase,
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lege" are only the stimulus. The Bible passage from Romans that he
opens to, "not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and
wantonness, not in strife and envying, put you on the Lord Jesus Christ,
and make not provision for the flesh in concupiscence" (Romans 13:1314)," only convinces him more that his soul needed a place to exercise its
God-given ability to be one with God and away from the world. We can
sense why Augustine theologically (philosophically) thinks it necessary to
retreat from the colors and sounds of Milan to the Cassiciacum retreat.
Here his soul wouldn't be as tempted to wander where his sense draws
hint Here his soul could concentrate on the Oneness, the Wholeness, of
life. It is in the city that the soul experiences want by the senses
grasping only the separation of things.

Ten years later in

The

Confessions Augustine would criticize the people of his times who live
only by their senses and who
go abroad to wonder at the heights of mountains, the
huge waves of the sea, the broad streams of rivers, the
vastness of the ocean, the turnings of the stars--and
they do not notice themselves and they see nothing
marvelous in the fact that when I mentioned all these
things I was not seeing them with my eyes, yet I would
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not have been able to speak of them unless these
mountains and waves and rivers and stars (which I
have seen) and the ocean (which I have heard about)
had been visible to me inside, in my memory, and with
the same great spatial intervals and proportions as if I
were really seeing them outside myself."
Memory as a Slave to the Mind
His soul and the souls of his acquaintances need to detach
themselves from the things of the world before they can practice the
ancient method of discovering the Truth, the method of human dialogue.
But memory is a key tool in leading Augustine's students out of the
cave of unwisdom to the light of wisdom, for it is needed to retain what
the student has heard from the philosopher, the lover of Wisdom.' It
is needed in all the necessary and worthy branches of learning (honestas

ac. necessaries disciplines). A wise man needs memory (memoria opus
esse sapienti).

Memory is a servant (servo tuo), yea, a slave of the soul.
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If it is used properly, it can lead you to the order of things.
Although memory occupies only a brief portion of Augustine's
dialogue in de Ordine, it is essential in understanding Augustine's
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educational thoughts. A commentary on memory is found in the tenth
book of

The Confessions.

Here we, too, find that memory is a slave of

the mind' or the soul, for both mind and soul are the same thing for
Augustine, "for whatever is in the mind is also in memory."'
It is the soul, fed by the images of memory, that discovers order.
The soul, if it is wise, holds fast to this order. In true Platonic fashion it
devotes itself to philosophy. At first it introspects itself. As soon as this
mode of learning has persuaded the soul that reason either is the soul
itself or belongs to it, it is less trusting of the senses. It discovers, too
that there is in reason nothing more excellent or dominant than
numbers, or that reason is nothing else than number.' Reason is the
capacity to analyze and to seek that which is a unity. The reasonable
examination of numbers begins with the number one. Reason seeks the
same thing that a soul seeks, that is, unity. It is Augustine who says "it
is oneness that I seek, it is oneness that I love."' It is no surprise that
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he clung to and fought for so often in his life the one "catholic"
expression of the church.
In order to make sense of the evil in life, memory is important, for
it feeds the rational soul that longs for a greater Whole. Once the highest
Good is reached the wise, godly man fixes his gaze on the immovable God,
"Who abides forever, for Whose presence there is no waiting, and of
Whose absence there is no fearing, because by the fact that He truly is, He
is always present. The wise man, the godly man, once he has arrived at
this happy life, conserves it well and uses his memory sparingly.»106
Therefore, the wise man in his pure enjoyment of God doesn't need
memory because all that he needs is fulfilled in that one grand moment
of contemplation. Yet, if he is to serve his fellowman, his soul needs what
memory can give him, a recall of past events.'
Reason Makes Sense out of Changes
Memory is of greatest value in leading some one, as Augustine does
Zenobius in de Ordine, from living on the level of the senses to living
on the basis of the perceptions of one's soul. Memory informs the soul

106 Augustine, de Ordine. BK. II, chap. II, par. VII, pp. 80-81.
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so that reason can sort through what the senses give memory. Although
the tenth book of The Confessions strikes the reader at first as a needless
appendix to his spiritual autobiography, it is central to understanding
Augustine's spiritual journey of moving from the Manichaean way of
explaining evil as substance to obtaining true Wisdom where all of life,
material as well as spiritual, is grasped as part of the whole and the happy
godly life is lived. This lower life is lived by the senses, passions and lusts.
Only memory itself can see that it is God (as Augustine so frequently
points out in The Confessions) all along who is behind every event,'
every tragedy that occurs in his life like the death of a dear unnamed
friend,' every hollow rhetorical deception that the Manichean Faustus
promoted,' the abrupt dismissal of his dear nameless mistress;" his
resignation from his shop-talk,112 and the death of his mother in
Ostia.' God, the highest Good, who changes not, who is present
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everywhere, is pursuing and guiding Augustine to the time of his
conversion and baptism. God is the Truth, the Wisdom and the Highest
Good, and who is behind the order of all things, but one does not arrive
at this spiritual insight by living according to one's passions or one's
senses. This lower level of living will lead one to pursue the prescriptions
of this world. These prescriptions lead Augustine's father, Patricius, to
want Augustine to pursue the vocation of a lawyer and for Augustine to
rebel and pursue the life of fame and glory, the life of a rhetor.
Like Cicero before him, Augustine, ever the academic, sees in the
rhetoric of his day a hollowness and a vanity that glorifies the self. So
rhetoric and its traditional classical goals to teach, to delight, and to
persuade needs to be combined with the philosophical pursuits of
Wisdom and Truth. Augustine knows from personal experience that the
tools of rhetoric, when applied in a skillful manner, could impress and
persuade the masses, but this does not make them worthwhile for the
Roman Empire or for the education of the man or woman of God. What
is needed, according to the recently converted Augustine, is a return to
the rigorous and demanding Socratic pursuit of Truth, and this Augustine
does from the beginning to the end of de Ordine.
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Augustine's first impressions of Cicero's Hortensius had not
changed. He was fully focused on the pursuit of Truth. Augustine saw
that for the Christian there was a necessary need for Plato's concern for
Truth, even if it had impractical consequences, so that Christianity could
be freed from the Roman cultural pursuits that led to vain-glory.
As a celibate and promoter of the monastic life (as Augustine
turned out to be), he pursued the same Platonic concerns in his quest to
find and refine a usable answer to the origin and place of evil in God's
ordered world. Now at the Vintage Vacation site of Cassiciacum and now
retired from his life as a rhetor, he sought to work out his educational
goals for the Christian man or woman who had to deal with the harshness
of fifth century Roman life and who lived in the cultural climate of

moira.
What made for a mature person of God in this type of world? How
did one attain this life? What were the methods of achieving it? How
did one see behind the cruel changeableness of life to the changeless, one
God? What tools could be used from the classical methodology of
education? And which ones needed to be discarded?
The simplistic answers of the Manicheans, who cloaked their
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answers in the rhetoric of their day, didn't satisfy the discerning and
gifted Augustine. The skeptical responses of the doubters of his day only
drove him away from God. But the thoughts of the Platonist gave him
wholeness in a disconnected and crude world. The evidence of their
influences could be seen in both the Socratic methodology and the
eventual answers that the retreaters with Augustine arrived at.
As he reported in The Confessions,' his conversion to Christianity
was coupled with a rejection of the things of this world. The dismissal of
his mistress was the first rejection, a resolution not to marry (even
though he was pledged to another woman) was the second, and the
teaching of rhetoric at his talk-shop was the last worldly involvement to
be rejected.' At the same time Augustine suffered from a breathing
disorder and needed to retreat for health reasons.116 It was in this idyllic
setting that Augustine wrote many of his formative works that set the
stage for his later educational philosophy for the Biblical exegete, de

Doctrines Christiana.
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The Soul (anima) Seeks the One (unum), Immovable God
Being the wordsmith that he is, Augustine sees in the words unum

(one) and anima (soul) similarities in meaning and purpose. The Latin
word for soul comes from the Latin word for one. Should it not be true
then that the soul seeks to return to the One God, from whom all things
come? Augustine's famous prayer then doesn't just sound good. It is
rooted deep within his philosophical way of dealing with the Christian's
journey to faith. "You [0 Lord] stimulate him to take pleasure in praising
you, because you have made us for yourself, and our hearts are restless
until they find peace in you."' The senses are incapable of
understanding; there are only traces of reason in them. It is the soul,
possessed with the powers of reason and identified with the activities of
the mind that can see beyond what the senses perceive to be the great

ordo of God.
The soul, returned to itself in this manner,
understands what is the beauty of the universe; this
term is evidently derived from the word unum (one).
Wherefore, the beholding of oneness is not granted to
that soul which wanders toward many objects and
eagerly pursues mental beggary, which, though it does
not know it, can only be avoided by keeping aloof from
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the multitude; and I mean, not just the multitude of
men, but of all things that the senses reach.118
It is the soul in the wise person who can carry out the objectives
of Augustine's educational pursuits--to know God and to know one's self.
The wise person loves wisdom, philosophy. To philosophy pertains a
twofold question: the first treats of the soul (Una de anima); the second
of God (alter de Deo). The first makes us know ourselves (Prima affect
ut nosmetipsos noverimus) (a directive that was rooted deep in the Greek

culture as so many of the Greek dramatists point out in their tragedies);
the second makes us know our origins (alters, ut originem nostram). 1"
(This God, although one and immovable like Plato's, the Greeks do not
know.)
The former is the more delightful to us; the latter is
more precious. The former makes us fit for a happy
life (beata vita); the latter renders us happy. The first
is for beginners (prima est illa discentibus); the latter,
for the well instructed (ista jam doctis). This is the
order of wisdom's branches of study (Hic est ordo
studiorum sapientiae, per quem fit quisque idoneus
ad intelligendum ordinem rerum) by which one

becomes competent to grasp the order of things and to
discern two worlds (duo mundos) and the very Author

' Augustine, de Ordine. Bk. I, chap. II, p. 11.
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the universe .. . (et ipsum parentum universitatis).
?-f
20
The soul's connection to God is not, as the Manicheans thought, a
connection of substance (Nihil velint omnino distare).

Like all of

creation the souls of people are distinct from God." Yet Augustine stops
short of saying how the souls come to be and what is their origin and
what actually are their powers here below. How far are they subject to
death? And are they immortal as Plato contends in the tenth book of his
The Republic because evils can not destroy them?' ". . . if any one
dares rashly and without due order of the branches of learning to rush
to the knowing of these things, he becomes, not a man of credibility; not
a man of discretion, but a man ready to discredit everything."' Like
the mysteries of the First Principles that God is one, omnipotent and that
He is tripotent, Father and Son and Holy Spirit,' Augustine leaves the
deeper understanding of the soul a mystery.
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God, as the Highest Reason to Which the Soul Returns
Since it is man's reason that gives him the capability to sort
through and connect the things that the senses feed it, man's reasoning
powers are most like God. It is the reasoning powers of God that connect
all things and give it an order. He calls God the over-soul or world-soul,
although later in his end-of-his-life writings he confesses that he has been
too rash in accepting this Platonic teaching and that neither reason nor
faith can prove whether there is an over-soul.' But the notion does
give greater support to his assumption that the soul longs for and desires
to return to its source.
"Now that which is rational in us, that which uses
reason and either produces or seeks after the things
that are reasonable--(Namque illud autem nobis est
rationale, id est quod ratione utitur et rationabilia
vel facit vel sequitur.) since by a certain natural bond

it was held fast in the fellowship of those with whom it
possessed reason as a common heritage, and since men
could not be most firmly associated unless they
conversed and thus poured, so to speak, their minds
and thoughts back and forth to one another--saw that
names or meaningful sounds, had to be assigned to
things, so that men might use the sense almost as an
interpreter to link together, inasmuch as they could

Cf. ibid., Bk. II, chap. XI, par. XXX, p. 131. In the footnote Russell cites
Augustine there "that he had been rash (temere) in accepting as true something not proved
either by reason or by faith" p. 186.
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not hear the present words of those not present.'

This reasonable God is the God of order, as Licentius states at the
beginning, who though he governs according to order also is governed by
order, for it was by order that Christ was sent by God the Father to

US.127

Then in what manner does God govern? He governs in such a way that
He not only does things by order, but He Himself is governed by order.
One can see this in nature that is put together in a well-fitting manner or
in a musical piece that is well harmonized or in the beauty of a dance or
in a piece of poetry that possesses a balance in the use of poetic
techniques. These lift the senses beyond themselves to the reasonable
order behind all things.'" This can be seen everywhere because God is
everywhere. "Perhaps because God is everywhere, then wheresoever the
wise man goes, there he finds God with whom he can be. So it follows
that we can at the same time affirm that the wise man passes from place
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to place- which is `to be moved'-- and yet that he is always with God."'
This wise man may move from place to place, but because he has a mind
and a soul he can be connected with the wise God in any place.
The Just God
Licentius, defending the position that God established order and is
governed by order,'3° also stated confidently that "God is absolutely just

(erat Deus justus)." There was never a time when he wasn't just (Deus
semperjustus nut) even though there was a time when there was not evil
(exstitit malum), for evil had a beginning. Where and how this evil
came from, Augustine didn't say. But it did have a beginning, and God
had the ability to distinguish evil from good (a bono sejungeret).' "For
the fact that evil had a beginning is surely not brought about by the
order of God; but when it had become a fact, it was included in God's
order."' Evil, then, is not totally in opposition with God but somehow
is mysteriously included in the order of God as dark colors are included
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with bright colors to make a picture.
The Incarnation and the Platonists
What sets Augustine apart from the Platonists is his belief that this
one, immovable God, who is present in all places at the same time, who is
tripotent, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, came among us for our sake.
These are part of the mysteries of the Godhead that set Augustine apart
from the Platonists, from the ingenious men (ingeniosorum superbia).'
It is the conviction of a true Platonist, like Apuleius of Madaura, that God
does not mingle with men.' What puzzles the Platonists is the seeming
contradiction that the One God could dwell among men, that the wholly
other God, the immovable God, could dwell among that which is
changeable, that the self-sufficient, good God can come to dwell among
mankind who is vulnerable to evil. This Augustine assumes is a part of
revealed truths.
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The Place of Poetry, Philosophy and Rhetoric
At the beginning of the discourse when Augustine finds that
Licentius is awake, Augustine challenges him to think about why the
waterfall flows intermittently. What he is really asking is for Licentius to
think about the order of things. Or what causes things to occur in the
manner that they do? Why do things happen the way they do? He is
challenging him to search for truth. Augustine says "Quite rightly,
therefore you were not marveling; and you were musing on Calliope."
(who is the chief muse of the poets).'

Augustine is moved to ask,

"Whence does marveling arise, or what is the source of this defect but
something unusual and apart from the evident order of its causes?" The
question evokes from Licentius a commitment to order. "Apart from the
evident order, I admit that, but, it seems to me, nothing is done apart
from order."' Licentius is now moved to study philosophy, for
philosophy, as he has begun to believe, is man's true and tranquil abode

(vera et inconcussa nostra habitatio).
Yet, Augustine doesn't reject everything related to poetry. In
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showing that moderation in poetry is connected to the reasonableness of
things, he says that the good poets know how to use the right amount of
solecisms and barbarisms, even though they call them tropes and
metaplasms. If we remove these from poems, shall we be so delighted?
"Because order directs and restrains them, it does not suffer them to be
in excess in their proper place, or to be anywhere out of place.
Unpretentious and seemingly inelegant diction, interspersed in a
discourse, brings bolder relief the fancy flights and the ornate
passages."'
Like Plato who banned the poets from his ideal republic, Augustine
is disturbed by his student's interest in poetry because such musings do
not lead to truth. Only Socratic-like questionings will lead to an
understanding of the ordering of things. The question at the Cassiciacum
retreat is, is there, in the face of the cruelities of the Roman world, an
order to things or not? Now drawn away from his poetry and toward the
search of truth, Licentius is convinced that there is an order to all things.
But the popular study of rhetoric doesn't fare much better for
Augustine. Now having given up his "talking-shop" in Milan, he is able to
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put in writing why he gave up the most popular field of study of his day.
He says that he is sorely vexed while teaching in the school of rhetoric in
Milan, "because boys were motivated, not by the advantage and beauty of
learning, but by the love of paltriest praise." (Sed inanissimae laudis

amore discerentur.)138

".

. . some of them were not even ashamed to

plagiarize the words of others."' Augustine fears that Licentius and
Trygetius want to introduce an enfeebling jealousy and empty boasting
into the philosophical discourse that they are having. These are the very
things that rhetoric plays upon. The pursuit of philosophy is the pursuit
of learning and wisdom for their own sakes. In true philosophy there is
no room for vanity. Augustine confesses that dialectic has the ability to
teach and to learn because it leads to the embrace of truth. When this is
shaped into oratory, it is called rhetoric.

Augustine describes his

resignation from his position as teacher of rhetoric in the following
manner.
And I decided in your sight that, without making
any violent gesture, I would gently withdraw from a
position where I was making use of my tongue in the
talking-shop, no longer should my young students (who
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were not so much interested in your law and your
peace as in absurd deceptions and legal battles) buy
from my mouth material for affirming their own
madness. And luckily it happened that there were only
a few days more before the Vintage Vacation, and I
decided to endure them so that I might retire from the
profession in a regular way. I had been bought by you
and was not going to return again to put myself up for
sale. . . . There was also the fact that that summer my
lungs had begun to give way as the result of overwork
in teaching. I found it difficult to breathe deeply; pains
in the chest were evidence of the injury and made it
impossible for me to speak loudly or for a long time. .
. . What had helped me in the past to bear my hard
labor had been the desire to make money. The desire
had now gone, and if its place had not been taken by
patience, I should have been quite overwhelmed by
staying on at my work. Some of your servants, my
brothers, may say that I sinned in this, because, with
my heart fully set on your service, I continued to hold
even for one hour my professorship of lies. But I know
that you, most merciful Lord, have pardoned and
remitted this sin too, along with any other terrible and
deadly sins in the holy water of Baptism. . . . And the
day came on which I was actually to be freed of this
profession of rhetoric, from which in my mind I was
already free. So it was done. You rescued my tongue
as you had rescued my heart. I rejoiced and blessed
you and with all my friends went off to the country
house. My writing was now done in your service,
through still, in this kind of breathing space, the breath
it drew was from the school of pride. . . . For till then,

the Spirit was not yet given, becausejesus was not yet
glorified. And the prophet cries out, How long, slow of
heart? Why do ye love vanity and seek after lying?
He cries out, How long? He cries out, Know this. And
I so long, not knowing, loved vanity and sought after
lying. And so I listened and trembled, because these
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words were spoken to such people as I remembered
myself to have been. For there was both vanity and
lying in those phantasms which I had accepted as the
truth, and now in the grief I felt at the remembrance
of it I loaded myself with bitter and sincere reproaches.
I wished that those who still love vanity and seek after
lying could have heard me.'
But philosophy seeks the Truth, and this Augustine does in the de
Ordine. The whole discourse at the Verecundus-owned retreat center is

set up like a Platonic dialogue. Augustine asks the question of his
students to stretch their mind about things that their senses cannot
perceive and only their minds can grasp. He is leading them out of the
"cave" of life and into the light of Truth; that order is that which will lead
us to God. The obstacle that remains in the way of grasping this truth
is all the evil that occurs in life. Where did it come from? Did it have an
origin? Is it included in the divine order of things? Is it governed or
does it govern?
Augustine begins examining the origin of evil in God's good
creation about twelve years before. Then, he finds what he thinks is the
answer in the teachings of the Manicheans. They explain evil as a
material substance and good as that which is spiritual. But evil as a

14° Augustine,

The Confessions. Bk. IX, chap. II- IV, pp. 185-190.

82
substance does not satisfy when one considers the revealed truth of
Scriptures in Genesis where we read that God created all things good.
Augustine finds in the classical methodology of education, with a Platonic
philosophical emphasis, the necessary tool to grasp life on a deeper level
than what the senses can perceive.
The Place of Philosophy
The person, therefore, who has been trained in the liberal arts

(disciplinarum liberalium) was best equipped to care (curas) for order
(ordinem). The liberal arts carried with them the notion that they freed
a man or a woman to be fully a man or a woman, a human being. They
delivered them from the bondages which the barbarians were subjected
to. It meant that the person was able to speak, to write, to create, and
above all to think. Hannah Arendt wrote that the ancient world
distinguished between "liberal" and "servile arts." She concluded that the
distinction is not so much that one works with one's brain and the other
with one's hands, but one made an impact on others through political
decisions. These political decisions involved occupations embracing

prudentia, the capacity for prudent judgment which was the virtue of
statesmen, and professions of public relevance (ad hominum utilitatem)
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such as architecture, medicine and agriculture.' Both needed the
training of the liberal arts, but the former pursued its end for its own
sake, therefore, Arendt ranked these occupations higher.
Augustine carried his pursuit of the happy life

(beata vita)

to

another level. He resigned from his "talking-shop" because the money he
earned from this occupation was based on the faulty notion of what was
perceived to be useful in Roman society--the skills of rhetoric to educate,
to delight, and to persuade. Augustine knew that finding the Truth of
God's order may not have any usefulness. It could be done for its own
sake. "In those years I taught the art of rhetoric. Overcome by a desire
for gain, I took money for speech making. Nevertheless, Lord as you
know, I preferred to have honest pupils ( as honesty is reckoned
nowadays); without deceit I taught them the arts of deception, to be used
not against the life of any innocent man, though sometimes to save the
life of the guilty."142

In the latter days of the fourth century people

would pay for such a useful skill. Augustine played with this distinction
even more

in de Doctrina Christiana.

141 Arendt, pp. 79-80.
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If we take Hannah Arendt's distinction as an accurate assessment of
the goal of liberal arts studies in the ancient Roman world, we will, then,
read in Augustine's challenge to his students at Cassiciarum a similar
challenge that they learn to love wisdom for its own sake. This is the
wise, godly person. This is the philosopher king.

This is attained

through that discipline of disciplines (disciplinam disciplinarum), which
is called dialectics (quam dialecticam vocant). This science teaches both
how to teach (docet docere) and how to learn (docet discere). ' "In it,
reason itself exhibits itself (ratio demonstrat), and reveals its own nature,
its desires, its powers. It knows what knowledge is; and by itself, it not
only wishes to make men learned, but also can make them so."1"
Augustine shapes his philosophical emphasis toward the love of God
for his own sake. He doesn't use the word "love" (amare) but the word
"enjoy" (frui). By this he means to enjoy God for his own sake. "'To
possess God (Deum habere)) is nothing other than to enjoy God (Deo

frui)."' This is the happy life (vita beata). This is done especially by
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those who have been trained through the liberal arts

(disciplinarum

liberalium) and challenged to exercise care (curo) for order (ordinem).
The Latin word

curo is key here. Cassell's Latin Dictionary defines

the word with several meanings: "to care for or to pay attention to or to
tend.21146

Langenscheidt Pocket Dictionary adds to these definitions, "to

be solicitous for and to think or.' Augustine's journey toward Truth
and the enjoyment of God in the face of all the cruelties of Roman life will
begin with

curas, with a deeper awareness of, yea, even a solicitous

pursuit of, things around his young charges than what the senses
provide or on the impulses that poetry reflects. At another place
Augustine uses the word marveling

(mirabilis, mirabaris).1" Cassell's

Latin Dictionary defines mirabilis in the first place as "wonderful" or
"astonishing" and secondly as "extraordinary" or "unusual".1"
So philosophy, which has as its goals the knowledge of God and the
knowledge of one's soul, begins with "wonder" or "astonishment", the

J. R. V. Marchant, ed. Cassell's Latin Dictionary. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls
Company), p. 147.
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"extraordinary" or "unusual". These promptings of the soul are best
done by one who has been trained in the liberal arts.
If you have a care (curas) for order, I reply, you must
return to those verses; for instruction in the liberal
arts (disciplinarum liberlium), if only it is moderate
and concise, produces devotees more alert and more
steadfast and better equipped for embracing the truth
(amplectendae veritati), so that, Licentius, they more
ardently seek (ardentius appetant) and more
consistently pursue (constantius insequantur) and in
the end more lovingly cling (inhaereant postremo
dulcius) to that which is called the happy life (quae
vocatur beata vita).150

One of Augustine's students at Cassiciacum, Alypius, follows
through and becomes the Catholic church's counterpart to a government
official. The young lawyer and close friend of Augustine becomes the
catholic bishop of Tagaste in North Africa and later the Primate of the
Province of Numidia.'
Augustine's Mother, Monica
But Monica, the mother of Augustine, who followed him to Milan
and now to Cassiciacum and to whose prayers Augustine attributed his

Augustine., de Ordine. Bk. I, chap. VIII, par. XXIV, pp. 46-47.By "those verses"
one can only assume that what Augustine means here is the liberal arts that aid one in
caring for the order of things.
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conversion, was now warmly included in the discourse at Cassiciacum.
And, mother, to the end that these petitions be most
observantly made, we enjoin the charge upon you,
through whose prayers I unhesitantly believe and
proclaim that God has given me this resolve: to prize
nothing more highly than the finding of truth, to wish
for, to think of, to love nothing else." (ut inveniendae

veritati nihil omino praeponem, nihil aliud velim, nihil
cogitem, nihil amem.)152

It is this author's contention that Monica is included in the
Cassiciacum discussion because as far back as Plato, women are allowed to
participate in the exercises of the Platonic dialectics whereas they are not
included in the schools of rhetoric.' This shows another shift in
Augustine's thinking after his conversion.

The Confessions tell us that

Augustine had once fooled his mother by leaving her at an oratory
dedicated to the memory of St. Cyprian near North African shores when
he went off to Rome.' The brilliant rhetor, then, does not recognize
women equal to any man who could use his rhetorical skills "to hate

152 Augustine, de Ordine. Bk. Chap. XX, par. LII, p. 169.
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another human being."' Now Augustine doesn't think it odd to include
his mother in the discussion about divine order. The footnote reads:
"Throughout the dialogue

(de Ordine) as well in the de Beata Vita,

Augustine pays beautiful tribute to his saintly mother Monica. In the
latter work, for example, he acknowledges his debt in these touching
words: 'I believe that through her merit I am all that I an13.31156 Again,
while the others marvel at his mother's intellectual discernment and
wisdom, Augustine does not hesitate to suggest that the source of her
enlightenment is far beyond the acquired learning of the pagan schools:
"She voiced those things in such a manner that we, wholly unmindful of
her sex, would feel that some great man was seated among us. Meanwhile
I became aware, as far as I could, from what source--yes, from how divine
a source--those things flowed."'
By including Monica in the discourse, Augustine makes it clear what
he is doing at the retreat at Cassiciacum. He is conducting a Platonic
discourse to pursue Truth, but now it is being tempered with the pursuit
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of the knowledge of the God who became incarnated among mankind.
How Does One Explain Evil?
Evil is the final obstacle in the pursuit of Truth. It is still an
obstruction in the quest for the knowledge of God. How can it be
included in order? Augustine's questions about evil are rooted in the life
experience of the death of a true friend and Augustine's subsequent
thoughts of suicide.' How do so many evils come to pass, although God
is omnipotent and effects nothing evil? For what purpose did God make
the world, although He is of no need of anything? Did evil begin in a
point in time? If it always is, is it always under God's control? If evil
always is, does it follow that the world always was?
If the world begins in time, how is evil held in check before the
beginning of time? If there is a time when evil is not under the control
of God, what suddenly happens that had not happened before? Is there
any harm that evil could do to God? Augustine concludes that "any
investigation in these matters which will need to be done concerning
these and similar matters, is to be made according to order or not at

Augustine, The Confessions. Bk.IV, chap. IV, pp. 73-75, also Bk. IV, chap. VI,
p. 76 says "I was at the same time thoroughly tired of living and extremely frightened of
dying."
158
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all.3115 9
As with Augustine's understanding of the soul, Augustine doesn't
have complete answers when answering the above questions. But he
starts with his original premise: nothing happens apart from the order
constituted by God. Therefore, he concludes that evil had a beginning.
He doesn't say when it happened or how it came about. Where did it
come from, especially if God is good? Could he that is good shape and
frame that which is not good? Augustine concludes "that evil had a
beginning, is surely not brought about by the order of God; but when it
had become a fact, it was included in God's order."'
This inclusion of evil in God's order is key to understanding
Augustine's thought here. He says it is something like a teacher, who
teaches grammar before he teaches the alphabet. Every one who deals
with life according to reason would say there is something wrong. A
teacher who teaches in this manner doesn't know the natural order of
things and the negative results to the students that will occur because of

Augustine, de Ordine. Bk. II, chap. XVII, par. VL, pp. 156-159. Ergo de his atque
hujusmodi rebus, aut ordine illo eruditionis, aut nullo modo quidquam requirendum est.
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this altered order. But this is an example of how evil works in life. It is
not the opposite of good; it is the diminishing of the good, for both
grammar and the alphabet are good in themselves, but when they are
taught out of order, evil results. Augustine points also to prostitution
as to how evil fits into God's world.
What can be mentioned more sordid, more bereft of
decency or more full of turpitude than prostitutes,
procurers and other pests of that sort? Remove
prostitutes from human affairs, and you will unsettle
everything on account of lusts; place them in the
position of matrons, and you will dishonor these latter
by disgrace and ignominy.'"

He suggests here, although he counters this assertion in a later work, that
prostitution has some merit. But by itself it is as evil as anything.
Augustine understands beauty in the same way. What would a
painting be like if it had only one color or only bright colors?
This truth is found in poetry, too. Good poetry needs a balance of
many poetic techniques: solecisms and barbarism or tropes and
metaplasms. The proper balance of them leads to a beauty of poetry.
Too much of one poetic technique will lead to an inappropriate
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imbalance, but this never occurs in good poetry.162
God does not love evil, Licentius states. God loves order; and
because he loves order, evil somehow gets included in the order of things.
"This thing he loves: to love good things, and not to love evil things--and
this itself is a thing of magnificent order and of divine arrangement. And
because this orderly arrangement maintains the harmony of the universe
by this very contrast [between good and evil], it comes about that the evil
things [lesser goods) must need be."'
The question of the presence of evil haunts Augustine all
throughout his life. With his conversation and development of a Christian
educational perceptive, Augustine not only comes to believe that the one,
eternal, unchangeable God became incarnate to rescue mankind but that
the means of enjoying Him and therefore living the happy life, Beata vita,
comes through the classical methodology of education with the goal of
training the students in the dialogue method of finding Truth. The
liberal arts are essential because they liberate the young from the servile
life of people who only live by their senses and do not exercise the innate
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qualities of the soul. An exercised soul, that longs for God, can enjoy God,
who has a grand design, much like the painter who preconceives a
painting before he puts the colors down on the canvass. The educational
process of exercising the soul is as important as finally sensing the divine
order behind all things. Both are found in de Ordine and both are for
Augustine necessary in answering why there is a presence of evil in a
universe that God had originally created as good.

III
de Doctrina Christiana
The Proper Understanding of Scripture
Leads us to Enjoy the Highest Good, the One God, the Trinity
About ten years (396) after the

Christianae vitae otium and the

discourse at Cassiciacum, Augustine, the Bishop of Hippo, wrote to
aspiring church leaders, "In all of these books those fearing God and
made meek in piety seek the will of God.' He was still the philosophical
ecclesiastical leader, who led toward the Highest Good, but now his search
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was filled with a much more thorough knowledge of the Christian classic,
the Scriptures.165 To realize how true this was the student of Augustine
will only have to note the increased number of Scriptural passages at the
bottom of the page in a scholarly edition of

de Doctrina Christiana as

opposed to the number of passages found at the bottom of a similar
edition of

de Ordine. But his approach to Scriptures was not like

Jerome's (now living in his latter years at Bethlehem) after his dream in
which he was called "more a Ciceronian than a Christian"' and after
which he vowed not to read any more pagan writers. Neither was
Augustine's approach like Tertullian's, who condemned the teaching of
pagan writers by Christians lest the teacher's faith be contaminated.
Augustine's approach did not reject his classical education. We only
have to read Book X of The

City of God Against Pagans to sense how well

Augustine knew his classical pagan writers and how freely he was willing
to make use of them.' Unlike the negative attitude toward the vain
pursuits of rhetoric which we found in
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Christiana we found that he was less critical of rhetoric. It was true that
many of his friends who were still Manicheans and who didn't
understand the Christian faith still viewed him as the teacher of rhetoric
that he once was.

De Doctrina Christiana, which Peter Brown called "one of the most
original that Augustine ever wrote,"168 is replete with references to Cicero,
the master rhetor, and Virgil, the master Roman poet. Augustine's
compromise is that "every good and true Christian should understand
3,169 Augustine states
that wherever he may find truth, it is the Lord's.
that the Christian use of pagan authors is like unto the Israelites, who,
when they fled in haste from slavery in Egypt, took with them the gold
and silver and clothing for their journey. "But they [the Egyyptians]
gave their gold, silver, and clothing to the people of God fleeing from
Egypt not knowing that they yielded those things which they gave 'unto
obedience of Christ."' Yet, they are of little value compared to the
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truths which are found in Scripture. "The knowledge collected from the
books of the pagans, although some of it is useful, is also little as
compared with that derived from the Holy Scriptures."'

De Doctrina Christiana is divided into four books. In the first
three we find Augustine leading his aspiring exegetes in an understanding
of the rules of Scriptural interpretation and in what can be trustworthy
and true in life about them. In the fourth book, added three years
before his death (427), he goes back to the use and misuse of rhetoric in
teaching the truths of Scripture. His main goal in

de Doctrina Christiana

is to train the aspiring Scriptural exegete and ecclesiastical orator in the
proper rules of Scriptural interpretation and in teaching its truths.
As it is true in every age, we approach the reading and studying of
Scripture with philosophical presuppositions. Augustine, as we have
already noted, is no different. He is influenced by the philosophical
notions that are embraced and discussed in Milan. He heard them in the
sermons of his mentor, Ambrose, who corrected the admirers of Plato
who thought that Plato taught Jeremiah the lessons of the Lord Jesus
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Christi' Augustine agrees with his spiritual mentor and stated that
Plato received his Christian-like understandings from Jeremiah at the time
when he traveled up to Jerusalem on his way down to Egypt. Augustine
was convinced that to believe the reverse was utmost madness.' This
gave Augustine justification to lean on Plato as he spelled out to his
aspiring exegetes that the first principle in Scriptural interpretation was
to enjoy the Highest Good, the Trinity, for his own sake. "This is a great
and arduous work,' for it means learning the disciplines of the mind
and the hard practice of virtue to arrive at such a conclusion.
In Platonic-fashion Augustine assumes that the harder and more
difficult it is to discover the truth the more the truth is appreciated.'
This assumption lends itself to an allegorical method of interpretation of
the Scriptures and to a moralistic approach of discovering God.
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Scripture Leads Us to The Enjoyment of God and The Love of Others
Truth, whether it is the truths of Scripture or the wizardry of
words that are heard from an orator, is seen as either "things" (res) or
"signs" (signum) but things are learned by signs. "All doctrine concerns
either things or signs, but things are learned by signs."' When using
this principle as applied to God, the Highest Good, Augustine (as he did
in de Ordine) encourages the use of man's mental powers over against his
senses, for the senses will lead one to believe in god as the sky or as the
brightest light in the sky or to think of a god of gods in terms of a bodily
shape. But if one thinks of God as high above all things, one does not
limit Him to what the senses perceive.

He, then, is one, immutable,

intelligible and spiritual. Thus God, to those who use their mental
powers, is that thing ( r es) who is perceived as above all other things.
Only such a God can be enjoyed for His own sake.
A sign is that which is used to signify something else, like
wood, stone, cattle, and so on. . . There are other
signs whose whole use is signifying like words. . . every
sign is also a thing for that which is not a thing is
nothing at all; but not everything is also a sign.. . Some

16 Augustine,

On Christian Doctrine. Bk. I, chap. II, p. 8. Omnis doctrina vet

rerum est, vet signorum; sed res per signs discuntur.
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things are to be enjoyed, others to be used, and there
are others which are to be enjoyed and used. Those
things which are to be enjoyed make us blessed. Those
things which are to be used help and, as it were, sustain
us as we move toward blessedness in order that we gain
and cling to those things which make us blessed.'
From this important passage we can sense that Augustine is convinced
that all of life is moving back toward God from whom all things came.
The aspiring Scriptural exegete will get a head start on this journey back
to God, the Highest God, if he masters the difficult art of knowing the
difference between the sign (signum) and the thing (res). It's the way
out of the darkness that hangs over the whole world because of sin. "For
the Fall had been, among many other things, a fall from direct knowledge
into indirect knowledge through signs. . . the knowledge by 'signs', with
flashes of direct awareness."' Only an exercise of one's mental powers,
coupled with a cleansing by virtue, will lead one to the source of all
things: the Trinity. This ability to see things behind the signs, Augustine
later says, liberates a man and aids in the journey back to God; whereas
the one who worships a significant thing without knowing what it signifies
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is a slave.'"
But to grasp God takes pure mental powers and moral purity. He
is enjoyed for His own sake, for there is nothing higher than He.
Therefore, he cannot be used to gain something higher.
The things which are to be enjoyed are the Father, the
Son, and the Holy Spirit, a single Trinity, a certain
supreme thing common to all who enjoy it, it indeed,
it is a thing and not rather the cause of all things, or
both a thing and a cause.'
The Incarnation of God in Jesus Christ increases our faith for him
whom we have never seen with our eyes. "He came to a place that he
already was."' Man does not know him because they are made
conformable to the world by their senses.182
In order to see and to believe the God above all gods, the mind
needs to be cleansed "so that it is able to see that light and to cling to it
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once it is seen.'183 Here Scripture helps. In fact the key to understanding
Scripture, for Augustine, is the two commandments found in Scripture:

Thou shalt love, He said, the Lord thy God with the
whole heart, and with the whole soul, and with the
whole mind and Thou shalt love thy neighbor as
thyself On these commandments hang all the Law and
the Prophets.'
Acts of charity, especially the act of charity toward one's enemies,
is an indication that the person is on a journey back to God. "I call
`charity' the motion of the soul toward the enjoyment of God for his own
sake, the enjoyment of God; but 'cupidity' is a motion of the soul toward
the enjoyment of one's self."' All of Scripture points to this, and if the
aspiring exegete does not read this in the Scriptures, he reads and
interprets them wrongly.
It is on the basis of this central principle of interpretation that
Augustine distinguishes between which passages should be read

I
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figuratively and which ones are to be read literally. Whatever passage
doesn't pertain to virtuous behavior or to charity is to be taken
figuratively. Augustine's approach to the study and the teaching of
Scripture ends up to be rather simplistic for any reader of the Scriptures
in the twentieth century: "Scripture teaches nothing but charity.)3186
Scriptures Expose Our Love of Temporal Things
"There is no need for a precept that any one should love
himself."' The love of self is embedded in the laws of nature. From the
man who loves his wife for only sexual pleasures and not for
procreation' to the man who is puffed up with pride when he
approaches Scripture,'" love of self needs no encouragements. "Thus the
proud man or the proud angel places his enjoyment in himself and
rejoices that others place their hopes in him also."' Scriptures will
reveal unto the reader his love of temporal things. ". . . the student first
will discover in the Scriptures that he has been enmeshed in the love of
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the world, or of temporal things, a love far remote from the kind of love
of God and of our neighbor which Scripture itself prescribes."19'
Faith Will Stagger If the Authority of Scriptures Staggers

De Doctrines Christiana makes clear that the difference between the
Platonist and the Christian is not so much "the Word made flesh"' but
the authority of Scriptures. These canonical books, that have been
selected by the largest number of catholic churches,'" bear an authority
that no pagan book can claim. One's faith relationship to these Scriptural
books is a direct outcome on how the churchman does acts of charity. If
the aspiring exegete has another interpretation of passages from
Scripture other than that which leads him to love God and love neighbor,
he will end up being angry at Scripture.' Or if he doubts Scripture, his
faith will stagger. "If faith staggers, charity itself languishes." Porro fide

titubante caritas etiam ipso languescit.195
It is quotes like these that lead D. W. Robertson, Jr. to write in the
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introduction of his de Doctrines Christiana that what sets Augustine
apart from the ancient classical world was an introduction of charity

(charitas). "Underlying the specific techniques of both interpretation and
exposition of Scripture the principle of first importance in St. Augustine's
mind is charity. The introduction and spread of this specifically Christian
doctrine marks the decisive break between antiquity and the Middle
Ages."196 But it is a charity that is supported by a faith in Scriptures. If
faith in Scripture fails, charity fails. It is the movement toward God, the
highest good, and in loving Him one loves one's neighbor.

The More Difficult the Passage the Greater the Appreciation
Yet, retaining the philosophical approach to Scriptures, Augustine
seeks to find in Scriptures hidden truths, much like when he found in the
order of things at Cassiciacum a meaning to life beyond what the senses
could give. Then, he used the Platonic dialogue method, now he discards
that method in favor of the lecture method. He acts as a bishop who
makes authoritative pronouncements to the aspiring young exegetes.
For Augustine the Jewish people do not know how to do this. They are

196 Ibid.,
p.

X.
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subject to temporal things and in such a way the One God is served.19'
This principle holds true in the understanding of places like the
pool of Siloe, where the Lord commanded the man whose eyes he anoints
with clay made of spittle to wash. This Augustine suggests could mean
some form of mystery, I. e., baptism.'"

This also holds true in

understanding a serpent. It exposes its whole body in order to protect its
head from those attacking it. This illustrates the sense of the Lord's
admonition that we are to be as serpents.
That is, for the sake of our head, which is Christ, we
should offer our bodies to persecutors lest the
Christian faith be in a manner killed in us, and in an
effort to save our bodies we deny God. It is also said
that the serpent, having forced its way through narrow
openings sheds its skin and renews its vigor. How well
this conforms to our imitation of the wisdom of the
serpent when we shed the "old man," as the Apostle
says, and put on the "new"; and we shed it in narrow
places, for the Lord directs us, "Enter ye in at the
narrow gate.'"
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A Sign Causes us to Think of Something Beyond
This interpretation sounds strange and unbecoming to our ears, it
would not have irritated Augustine's philosophical leanings. The
allegorical method of interpretation fits his way of finding the truth
behind the events of life as well as fits the manner in which Scripture
becomes for him that which held the Truth behind the words, events, and
characters.
. . . A sign is a thing which causes us to think of
something beyond the impression the thing itself
makes upon our senses. Thus if we see a track, we
think of the animal that made the track; if we see
smoke, we know that there is a fire which causes it; if
we hear the voice of a living being, we attend to the
emotion it expresses; and when a trumpet sounds, a
soldier should know whether it is necessary to advance
or to retreat, or whether the battle demands some
other response.'
Augustine says numbers found in the Scriptures should be
understood with intelligence. After working through his Scriptural
numbers, we still wonder what he has in mind. But, as Peter Brown

Ibid., Bk. II, chap. I, p. 34. . . . Sign um est enim res praeter speciem, quam

ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem venire: sicut
vestigio viso transisse animal, cuius vestigium est, cogitamus, et fumo viso
ignem subesse cognoscimus, et voce animantis aufita adfectionem animi eius
advertimus et tuba sonante milites vel progredi se, vel regredi, et si quid
aliud pugna postulat, oportere noverunt.

107
points out, different numbers are important to the educated pagan man.
The number nine, which is not one of the major numbers dealt with in
the Scriptures, is important in the Roman world. It is the number of
Muses that inspire the poets. Every educated Roman from childhood
knows this.' Augustine argues, "We must not listen to the superstition
of the pagans who profess that the nine Muses are the daughters of Jove
and Memory. They are refuted by the historian Varro, . . . I know of no
202
one more eager and learned in such matters."

Augustine relates what

Varro told about a certain city that contracted three sculptors to do
three statues of the Muses. The best three would be placed in the temple
of Apollo. The city leaders find that each set of three Muses is beautiful,
and all nine figures please the city leaders. And all of them are bought
and dedicated in the temple. The poet Hesiod names all nine of them,
preserving the superstition of the number nine.
Augustine points out to his aspiring church leaders that the number
three is embedded in nature, for the city does not come upon the number
three because any one has seen three Muses in a dream,
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but (as Varro says) because it is easy to see that all
sound which furnishes material for songs is of a
threefold nature. It is either produced by the voice,
like the sound made by those who sing from the throat
without instrumental accompaniment, by the breath,
like the sound made by trumpets and flutes, or by
striking, like the sound produced by harps, drums, or
other percussion instruments.'

Augustine, by quoting Varro, is trying to come up with what he thought
is a scientific explanation or scholarly support of why there are three
Muses, stripping the Roman world of superstition connected with the
number nine, a non-Biblical number.
Augustine counters the number nine with the Scriptural number
of ten, which, of course, is the number of the commandments as well as
the number of plagues Moses delivers unto the Egyptians. But Augustine
sees the number ten in many more Scriptural references.
. . . Again the number ten signifies a knowledge of the
Creator and the creature; for the trinity is the Creator
and the septenary indicates the creature by reason of
his life and body. For with reference to life there are
three, whence we should love God with all our hearts,
with all our souls, and with all our minds; and with
reference to the body there are obviously four
elements of which it is made.'
203
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As twentieth--century Scriptural readers, have we, by reading this
passage from Augustine, gotten any closer to understanding the number
ten in Scripture? We do not think so, but this would not have been true
for Augustine. His point here wasn't a deeper understanding of the
number ten. His point was that he had replaced the Roman number nine
with a more Scriptural number, the number ten. The fact that his
explanation of the number ten was obscure would not have bothered him,
for he was convinced that an obscure meaning brought one closer to
God. He argued in order to strip the Roman world of its superstitions and
led it to the authority of philosophical thinking and Scripture. The
aspiring exegetical mind that has been exercised to think in this manner
has drawn closer to God.

He has also been led to think more

scientifically, less fatalistically. After Augustine, Moira or eventus will not
have as tight a grip on the Roman world as it once had.
Things of music, too, may halt and impede the reader. Music was
used at the Roman theater to arouse the emotions of the audience as
they celebrated the immorality of the gods. But, since musical
instruments were used in Scripture, anything that the aspiring exegete
can learn from the world of music that could used to understand
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Scripture, in fact, should be used.'
Wherever the Christian Found Truth, It Was the Lord's
Augustine's principle for determining what the Scriptural exegete
could use and what he should discard was determined by what he found
to be true, for "wherever he [the Roman] may find truth (veritatem) it
is the Lord's." The pagan Roman, ensnared in his supersititions, thought
he had truth, but it was a truth that preempted the Truth of God. For
Augustine the pagan Roman wasn't filled with the love and enjoyment of
the One, immutable God for his own sake nor filled with enough
charitable acts toward his neighbor. He was filled too much with
wretched pagan superstitions.
The Study of Astrology Was Rooted in Fate-filled Notions
Many of these superstitions centered around astrology, especially
the ones called genethliaci, which has to do with birthdays, or commonly,
mathematici [judicial astrologers]. Augustine's criticism ran deep.
Although these men may seek out and even find the
exact position of the stars at the time someone is born,
yet when they seek to predict on that basis either our
actions or the outcome of our actions they err greatly
and sell unlearned men into a miserable servitude. For
zos Cf. ibid., Bk. II, chap. XVII p. 54.
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a man who is free when he goes to such an astrologer
gives his money that he may leave him as the servant
either of Mars or of Venus, or rather of all the stars to
which those who first erred in this way and passed
their error on to posterity gave names of beasts
because of the resemblances or names of men in an
effort to honor men. . . . To desire to predict at birth,
on the basis of such observations, the habits, actions,
and fortunes of men is a great error and a great
madness."'
Augustine refuted these astrological superstitions by pointing out
that all these predictions are based on the opinion of wretched men. And
secondly, these predictions can be disproven by the observation of what
happened to the Scriptural twins, Jacob and Esau.
Thus we know that Esau and Jacob were born twins in
such a way that Jacob, who was born last, was found
holding with his hand the foot of his brother who went
before. Certainly, the day and hour of birth for these
two could not be otherwise noted except in such a way
that the constellation for both should be the same. Yet
what a difference there was in the manners, deeds,
labors, and fortunes of these two men the Scriptures,
now accessible to all men, testifies.2°7
Augustine's felt that such superstitions led to useless falsehoods and
reflect "pacts and contracts with demons."' Evidence of "pacts and
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contracts with demons" was that people who predict the future of an
individual based on the stars seldom agree. Augustine suggested that
when men agreed among themselves a practice or an institution became
useful. "For all practices which have value among men because men agree
among themselves that they are valuable as human institutions . . .3)209
But the useful and necessary institutions established by
men with men include whatever they have agreed upon
concerning differences of dress and the adornment of
the person useful for distinguishing sex or rank, and
innumerable kinds of signs without which human
society could not or could not easily function, including
weights and measures, differences of value and
impression in coinage appropriate to specific states and
peoples, and other things of this kind. . . . But all this
part of human institutions helpful to the necessary
conduct of life is not to be shunned by the Christian;
rather, as such institutions are needed, they are to be
given sufficient notice and remembered.'
Therefore, instead of turning to Julius Caesar, who was said to have
had his many fortunes in life because he was born at the time of the
appearance of a comet, Augustine lifted up these two Biblical characters
to refute the very deep notions of fate (moira) in Roman culture. Jacob
and Esau were not governed by a common fate. And finally, he refuted
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the practice of astrology by pointing out that no two interpretations
agreed.
Moreover, they imply a pestiferous curiosity, an
excruciating solicitude, and a mortal slavery. They
were not noticed because of any innate validity, but
they were made to have validity through being noticed
and pointed out. Thus they seemed different to
different people in accordance with their thoughts and
presumptions."'

One thing meant one thing among the Romans and another thing
among the Greeks. "Therefore, just as all of these significations move
men's minds in accordance with the consent of their societies and because
this consent varies, they move them differently, nor do men agree upon
them because of an innate value, but they have a value because they are
agreed upon./3212
Yet, Augustine encouraged the scientific study of astronomy. If one
knew the present position of the stars, it was possible to trace their past
courses according to a rule. Therefore, one can predict the future
according to the same rule. This was not superstitious and portentous
but certain and fixed by calculation. There was no lesson for life here.
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"We do not seek to learn here any application of our deeds and fates in
the manner of the ravings of the astrologers but only information that
pertains to the stars themselves."'
Augustine's criticism of astrology went deeper. It was based on
astrology's violation of the first commandment. Astrology named
constellations and planets, which originally had no names, after men and
gods and overlooked the God who created the stars and ordered them.'
But his criticism was also based on science. Astrology failed to see the
order that God has placed in the motion of the stars; and therefore,
Roman pagan culture, by clinging to such superstitious notions, had kept
the Roman world from truth.
Truth of an Institution Depended upon Common Agreement
How can one tell whether a custom or an institution can be trusted
or not? Here Augustine sounded strikingly modern. Like astrology and
other superstitions which produced a variety of interpretations so
Augustine was against variety in institutional practices. These came from
the devil. These were to be eradicated from the Christian's mind. It was
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a common agreement of men, like the rule of the majority, that made a
practice, custom, or institution trustworthy or not. "Some of these are
superfluous and extravagant, others useful and necessary."' He was
especially critical of the variety of ways in which signs were interpreted.
These were not valid except by common consent.

(Nisi consensus

accedat)"6
But the useful and necessary institutions established by
men with men include whatever they have agreed upon
concerning differences of dress and the adornment of
the person useful for distinguishing sex or rank, and
innumerable kinds of signs without which human
society could not or could not [sic] easily function,
including weights and measures, differences of value
and impression in coinage appropriate to specific states
and peoples, and other things of this kind. . . . But all
this of human institutions helpful to the necessary
conduct of life is not to be shunned by the Christian;
rather, as such institutions are needed, they are to be
given sufficient notice and remembered.'
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Logical Truth Was Found in Scriptures
Augustine saw a similar logic embedded in the Scriptures. Or he
seemed to be saying, "the Scriptures themselves are logical."
CC

. . . the truth of propositions is a matter to be discovered in sacred

books

1,218

Augustine drew upon the writings of St. Paul in the 15th

chapter of 1 Corinthians to show how false inferences can be drawn from
a true proposition. The true proposition was that Christ was raised from
the dead; the false inference is that the dead shall not rise. Sometimes
it did happen that true inferences can come from false premises.
"However, the truth of valid inference was not instituted by men; rather
it was observed by men and set down that they might learn or teach
it."' Drawing from the same premise as in de Ordine, Augustine wrote
in de Doctrina Christiana, that ". . .it is perpetually instituted by God in
the reasonable order of things. Thus the person who narrated the order
of events in time did not compose that order himself . . .

.”220 When a

consequent was false, it was necessary that the antecedent upon which it
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was based be false also. This can be found in St. Paul's defense of the
resurrection of the dead in I Corinthians 15.
Those whose error the Apostle wished to refute had set
forth the antecedent that there is no resurrection of
the dead. But the consequent follows from this
antecedent that there is no resurrection of the dead
that "then Christ is not risen," but this consequent is
false. For Christ arose, so that the antecedent is false
that there is no resurrection of the dead. It follows
that there is a resurrrection of the dead. This may be
put briefly as follows: "If there is no resurrection of
the dead, neither was Christ resurrected. But Christ
was resurrected. Therefore there is a resurrection of
the dead." The principle that if the consequent is false
the antecedent must also be false was not instituted by
men, but discovered. And this rule applies to the
validity of inferences, not to the truth of
propositions."'
Knowledge of Scriptural Languages Aided the Discovery of Truth
Even though Augustine was said to have been a "poor" Greek
student in his school days, he encouraged the aspiring Scriptural exegete
to be proficient in the Scriptural languages. ". . . he will become the only
Latin philosopher in antiquity to be virtually ignorant of Greek."'
However, a thorough knowledge of Greek could have helped Augustine to
explain unknown words and locutions. He would have been closer to an
m Ibid., Bk. H, chap. XXXII, pp. 68-69.
222
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understanding of the original text and would have been able to explain
the ambiguities of the Scriptures, as in the following passage in which
Augustine did reflect some knowledge of the Greek language.
Not only ambiguities of this type but also those which
do not depend on punctuation or pronunciation should
be treated in the same way. Consider the passage from
Thessalonians: "Therefore we were comforted,
brethren, in you." (I Thess. 3:7) It is doubtful whether
"brethren" [Latin, frcrtres] should be read as a vocative
[as in the translation above] or as an accusative [so as
to read aon this account we have comforted the
brethren among you"]. But in Greek the two cases do
not have the same form, and when the Greek text is
examined, the word is found to be vocative. But if the
translator had been willing to say, Propterea,
consolationem habuimus, fratres, in vobis [instead of
consolati sumus], the translation would have been
literal but also less doubtful as to meaning.'
Knowing the original Scriptural languages, the aspiring exegete will
know more accurately whether the Scriptural words were to be taken
figuratively or literally.224 This was an important skill to master for
Augustine because not to know the difference between the literal and the
figurative was to fail to demonstrate what distinguishes a man from a
beast, which is understanding. When man was subjected to the "flesh" of
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a word, Augustine assumed that he is less than a man.
For example , if he hears of the Sabbath, he thinks only
of one day out of the seven that are repeated in a
continuous cycle; and if he hears of Sacrifice, his
thoughts do not go beyond the customary victims of
the flocks and fruits of the earth. There is a miserable
servitude of the spirit in his habit of taking signs for
things, so that one is not able to raise the eye of the
mind above things that are corporeal and created to
drink in eternal light.'

Rhetoric Can Be Used in Service of Truth
In the fourth book of de Doctrines Christiana Augustine returned
to the subject by which he once earned a living, the art of rhetoric. This
time he handled it in a more balanced way than in de Ordine. Now he saw
some usefulness in it for the aspiring Scriptural exegete. After all, its
skills, which were "to learn the art of words, to acquire that eloquence
that was essential to persuade men of your case, to unroll your opinions
before them,"' were being acquired and practiced in schools of rhetoric
throughout the Roman Empire in Augustine's day from Bordeaux to

225

Ibid., Bk. III, chap. V, p. 84.

226

Brown, p. 36. Brown is here quoting from Augustine's The Confessions. Bk. I, chap.

XVI.

120
Antioch.' Being educated to be a complete Roman and being practiced
in the art of rhetoric, he knew its power and effect on people when used
as a teaching tool and realized that its first task was to teach before it
could be used to delight and persuade. The aspiring exegete would have
to teach the Scriptural truths he discovered, and he would have to do it
in a delightful and persuasive manner. What he didn't like about the art
of rhetoric was its natural inclination to puff up the one using it and
even the one hearing it into thinking that the mere eloquence of words
made the words true. They "place their own language above the language
of our authors, not because of its greatness but because of its vanity."'
This was "often extremely injurious and profits no one."' "For a man
speaks more or less wisely to the extent that he has become more or less
proficient in the Holy Scriptures."230
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Rhetoric Should Not Be Taught

Per Se

Augustine argued that if rhetoric can be used in either urging evil
or justice, why should it not be used for good in the service of truth?
Augustine's balanced approach to the use of rhetoric was based on the
fact that rhetorically crafted speeches were heard in all public places
throughout the Roman Empire. The Christian orator would naturally
imitate them anyway. Yet, Augustine did not want the rules of rhetoric to
be taught in his Christian schools, for the same reason that he once gave
up the teaching of rhetoric years before--because it led to the pursuit of
vain glory.
But first in these preliminary remarks I must thwart
the expectation of those readers who think that I shall
give rules of rhetoric (rhetorica daturum) here which
I learned and taught in the secular schools (scholis
saecularibus). And I admonish them not to expect
such rules from me, not that they have no utility
(utilitatis), but because, if they have any, it should be
sought elsewhere if perhaps some good (bono) man has
opportunity to learn (discere) them. But he should
not expect these rules from me, either in this work or
in any other."'

231 Ibid., Bk. IV, chap. I, p. 118.
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The Ecclesiastical Orator Was Unaware of His Eloquence
Augustine was convinced that the rules of eloquence should not be
taught overtly, but they should be learned by reading and by hearing, by
imitation. The ecclesiastical orator will have learned eloquence if he
practiced writing, dictating, or speaking according to the rule of piety
and faith. Even those who have learned these rules and spoke fluently
and eloquently cannot be aware of the fact that they were applying them
while they were speaking unless they were discussing the rules themselves.
Why can't men learn expressions of eloquence through imitation
(imitando) rather than following rules of eloquence?' Learning by
imitation wasn't anything new. The Greek tragic poets used it in their
presentation of the tragic hero. The Greek hero was an imitator of an
action, and the audience, as least in terms of emotions, imitated and
identified with the hero, through his rise and fall. The audience's
identification with the hero led to a keener sense of self-awareness and
brought about a catharsis in the emotions of pity and fear.'
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Scriptural Rhetoric Did Not Abandon Wisdom
Augustine's wise man was not so much schooled in the rules of
eloquence but in the truths of the Scriptures, for Scriptures themselves
abounded in examples of rhetoric. Augustine saw in St. Paul's passage in
Romans 5:3-5 an example of gradatio, "where words or meanings are
234
connected by proceeding one from the other." "But we glory also in
tribulations, knowing that tribulation worketh patience; and patience
trial; and trial hope; and hope confoundeth not because the charity of
God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us."
Within this passage we also found what the Latin rhetorians call membra
(portion of anything) or caesa (short sentences). Augustine called a
group of

membrae a circuitus or a going around in a circle. This, too, is

found in this passage. "But just as we do not say that the Apostle
followed the precepts of eloquence, so also we do not deny that his
wisdom was accompanied by eloquence."235 Augustine said the same
rhetorical devises can be found in St. Paul's second letter to the
Corinthians, 11:16-30.

Sensing in true Platonic fashion that the
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prophetic writings of the Old Testament were obscured by many tropes
or figurative words, Augustine knew that the prophetic words became
sweeter when the aspiring exegete explained them. He found in Amos
6:1-6 an example of a Scriptural writer, who while retaining the Wisdom
that Augustine was looking for, did not abandon the use of eloquence:'
'Woe to you that are wealthy in Sion, and to you that
have confidence in the mountain of Samaria: ye great
men, heads of the people, that go in with the state into
the house of Israel. Pass ye over to Chalane, and see,
and go from thence into Emath the great: and go down
into Geth of the Philistines, and to all the best
kingdoms of these: if their border be larger than your
border. You that are separated unto the evil day; and
that approach to the throne of iniquity; You that sleep
upon beds of ivory, and are wanton on your couches:
that eat the lambs out of the flock, and the calves out
of the midst of the herd; You that sing to the sound of
the psaltery; they have thought themselves to have
instruments of music like David; That drink wine in
bowls, and anoint themselves with best ointments: and
they are not concerned for the affliction of Joseph."'
Augustine saw in this passage, which he took from Jerome's Latin
translation rather than the usual Greek Septuagint, six membra formed
by three circuitus, starting with the repeating of "you's". The eloquence
in this passage can not be sensed so much by reading this passage silently
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as by hearing this series of "you's" read orally. The change and
softening of the voice would come with the reading of "you that sing to
the sound of the psaltery", 238 for the prophet was not speaking to the
people but for the people. "A good listener warms to these words not so
much by diligently analyzing them but by hearing them pronounced
energetically."239
Therefore let us say that our canonical authors and
teachers were not only wise but eloquent in that kind
of eloquence which is appropriate for such persons.. .
. we [the aspiring Christian orator] must imitate them
in that which they have spoken with a useful and
healthful obscurity for the purpose of exercising and
sharpening, as it were, the minds of the readers and of
destroying fastidiousness and stimulating the desire to
learn, canceling their intention in such a way that the
minds of the impious are either converted to piety or
excluded from the mysteries of the faith.'
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Augustine Used Cicero's Three-pronged Approach to Rhetoric
Using Cicero's three pronged use of rhetoric (to teach is a necessity,
to please is sweetness, to persuade is wisdom), Augustine encouraged the
Christian orator to communicate in such a fashion that he was
understood. Often this was determined not so much by what was said as
by the manner in which it was said. To teach was of first importance to
the Christian orator, but to retain the interests of the listeners an orator
must learn the art of delighting. Yet the highest form of eloquence was
the art of persuasion, for persuasion was victory. People may be taught
and pleased and still not consent. A listener, however, was to be
persuaded
. . . if he loves what you promise, fears what you
threaten, hates what you condemn, embraces what you
commend, sorrows at what you maintain is to be
sorrowful; rejoices when you announce something
delightful, takes pity on those whom you place before
him in speaking as being pitiful, flees those whom you,
moving fear, warn are to be avoided; and is moved by
whatever else may be done through grand eloquence
toward moving the minds of listeners, not that they
may know what is to be done, but that they may do
what they already know should be done.'
Such an orator would move people best if he lived what he spoke.

241 Ibid.,

Bk. IV, chap. XII, pp. 136-137.

127

But when that which is taught must be put into

practice and is taught for that reason, the truth of
what is said is acknowledged in vain and the eloquence
of the discourse pleases in vain unless that which is
learned is implemented in action. It is necessary
therefore for the ecclesiastical orator, when he urges
that something be done, not only to teach that he may
instruct and to please that he may hold attention, but
also to persuade that he may be victorious.'

just as what we found Augustine saying about poetry in de Ordine,
that poetic devices ought to be done in moderation, we found him urging
that any one rhetorical device should not be used in excess. When
oratory was spoken with "too much profusion it is displeasing."2' Rather
the Christian orator ought to accomplish more through the piety of his
prayers than through the skill of his oratory, "so that, praying for himself
and for those whom he is to address, he is a petitioner before he is a
speaker. 2" "For it is not you that speak, but the Spirit of your Father
that speaketh in you." (Matthew 10:20) "He who sought to teach in
speech what was good, spurning none of the three principles of rhetoric,
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should pray and strive that he be heard intelligently, willingly, and
obediently. When he does this well and properly, he can justly be called
eloquent,. . .))245
Augustine Used Cicero's Concern That Oratory Should Vary
Turning to the master Roman orator Cicero again, Augustine urged
that oratory should vary according to the subject: small things in a
subdued manner, moderate things in a temperate manner, and grand
things in a grand manner. Augustine knew that the ecclesiastical orator
has a grand subject, because it dealt with man's eternal welfare, and
therefore, we would think that he would urge that this subject would be
delivered in a grand manner, but he urged that the grand subject of
man's salvation should be delivered in a subdued manner. Nevertheless,
although our teacher should speak of great things, he should not always
speak about them in a grand manner, but in a subdued manner when he
taught.
Yet, within Scripture, there are found all three styles. In Matthew
25 where the Christian is urged to share a cup of water with another,
this is to be spoken in a subdued manner, because a cup of cold water is

245

Ibid., Bk. IV, chap. XVII, p. 142.

129
a small and most insignificant thing. The promise attached to it is also
small and insignificant, too.'" Augustine sees in the twelfth chapter of
Romans a moderate style, because almost all of it is exhortation. "I
beseech you, therefore, brethren, by the mercy of God, that you present
your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to God."' (Romans 12: 1)
And later in the same chapter he writes, "Rejoice with them that rejoice;
weep with them that weep." And in the mighty eighth chapter of Romans,
he speaks in a grand style when he speaks so convincingly of the love of
God in Christ. "For I am sure that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor
principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor
might, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature shall be able to
separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord."
(Romans 8:38-39)248
Variety in oral presentation is what Augustine urged for the
Christian orator. "When those things which must be said in the subdued
style have been interposed, we return effectively to those things which
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must be said in the grand style, so that the impetus of our speech ebbs
and flows like the sea."' Fit the manner of speaking with the subject
matter. Know the subject matter beyond the words. Look behind them
and find out how the original writer or speaker would have meant them
to be spoken. There is a useful Platonic directive here. Find the thing

(res) beyond the sign (signum).
Augustine said that the martyred church father Cyprian
appropriately used the subdued style himself when discussing the
sacrament of the chalice. There he resolved the question as to whether
or not the Lord's chalice would contain water alone or water mixed with
wine.' And he used the moderate style when addressing virgins who
because of greater glory deserved greater care. And Ambrose did the
same when he said, "She was a virgin not only in body but also in mind.
Her sincere disposition was not stained by any traces of deceit."' And
Augustine himself used the grand style when he was dissuading the people
of Caesarea in Mauritania from civil war--"for not only the citizens
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themselves, but relatives, brothers, even parents and children, divided
themselves into two parts for several successive days at a certain time of
the year and solemnly fought each other with stones and each killed
whomever he could--I pleaded in the grand style .
Augustine summarized the use of Ciceronian principles by saying.
"But is it true that all who are delighted are changed as in the grand style,
all who are persuaded act, or in a subdued style all are taught know, or
believe to be true, what they did not know before?"' Not every style will
bring its designated results. But the master orator has a sense when a
style should be used. And Augustine, the bishop of Hippo, has a sense
when the truths of the classical methodology should be used and when
they should be discarded. The principle of charity governed all things as
it governed the manner in which the aspiring exegete read his Scriptures.
One reason Augustine stood at an "Axial Period" in human history
was because his educational philosophy helped free the western world
from superstitions. For example, Augustine, as we pointed out previously,
had no time for the belief that the stars hold the secret to one's future.
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To desire to predict at birth, on the basis of such
observations, the habits, actions, and fortunes of men
is a great error and a great madness. For they observe
the configurations of the stars which they call
constellations at the time of birth of the one
concerning whom these wretched men are consulted by
those even more wretched."'

His strongest point, however, against astrology's accurate predictions is

when he cited the example of Jacob and Esau. Their life stories differ, yet
they were born under the same configuration of the stars.
And finally rhetoric itself, because it can be used to promote either
justice or evil, should be used by the Christian. " . . . why should it not be

obtained for the uses of the good in the service of truth if the evil usurp
it for the winning of perverse and vain causes in defense of inquity and
error?"' Reflecting still his distain for the vain-glory that the person
gifted in rhetoric often sought, Augustine stated that the rules of rhetoric
will not be taught in his school. "And I admonish them not to expect such
rules from me, not that they have no utility, but because, if they have
any, it should be sought elsewhere if perhaps some good man has the
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opportunity to learn them."'
So we have come full circle, so to speak, from Augustine who
rejected his talk-shop at the time of his conversation to Augustine seeing
something useful in the goals of rhetoric, namely "to teach, to delight,
and to persuade". In de Doctrina Christiana it was apparent that some
of the truths that Augustine thought were the Lord's were the truths of
what made human speech effective. Augustine has learned that the
mature Christian still has to live in the world of words. Here the catholic
Christian was to use God's gift of speech wisely, but not arrogantly.
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Summary
Augustine of Hippo, as a young man, was a man of his times. True
to the spirit of the 4th century Roman culture that nurtured and
schooled him, the brilliant young Augustine pursued the most popular
academic discipline of the day: rhetoric. This popular discipline fit his
gifts to teach an abstract truth, to turn a Latin phrase in an interesting
way, and to convince others, even if it meant making a lie look like a
truth. Finding in Cicero's Hortensius a kindred spirit, Augustine
recognized in himself at the early age of nineteen his life's passion--the
pursuit of Truth. Given the Roman culture's fascination with rhetoric, it
is not surprising that Augustine's deep-seated passion for Truth resulted
in a conflict with this Roman fascination. The personal tensions that
Augustine found within himself had been going on in Graeco-Roman
culture since the days of Plato and Isocrates. In the Roman culture
Isocrates' school of rhetoric won out; but spiritually Plato's philosophical
principles were used to grasp the unchangeable, eternal Truth of God.
This Truth finally possessed Augustine's soul.
The question for our purposes was--how much of the classical
methodology of education, that reflected so much of what the 4th
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century Roman society was, would Augustine retain and how much of it
would he discard? Or how would Augustine work through the tension
between his baptismal immersion into the Incarnated Word and the
Roman culture in which he was also so thoroughly immersed?
In de Ordine we found Augustine with his young followers and
mother working through an answer to the questions concerning the
presence of evil in God's good creation. The setting was Cassiciacum near
Milan. The atmosphere was relaxed and perfect for a philosophical
examination of this difficult theological question. The time was soon
after his conversion in the late summer of 386 and before his baptism on
Easter of 387. He has thoroughly and premediatatively given up his way
of thinking as a rhetor and has thrown himself into the Platonic manner
of thinking, in order to come up with a theological answer to the
questions, does evil exist inside or outside of God's providence? Does God
have a design that includes even the evil that is opposed to him?
In a Socratic manner he led his chief student Licentius to the
conclusion that God did have an order that laid behind and beneath the
hard cruelties of Roman culture. This order of God was like the design of
a painter who painted with both dark and light colors or like the poet
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who used barbarisms as well as accepted poetic techniques to compose a
poem. The dark colors and barbarisms may appear at first to be bad (like
evil) but in the greater design of the painting and the poem they fit.
Augustine's answer to the presence of evil, arrived at through the
perceptions of the soul, was convincing and useful for any thinking
Christian who was forced to live with the harshness of life. There was an
order behind all things. It was the providence of the one, unchangeable,
immovable God who became incarnate in human flesh. This salvific act
itself was part of God's order. And this divine order can be best seen by
those who have been trained in the classical methodology of education:
in letters and grammar, in the Greek and Roman classics, in the
wondering about things, and above all, in the ability to question the cause
of all things. This was what Augustine was training his students to do at
Cassiciacum. Through it they would have an answer to the presence of
the harsh cruelties in life.
Ten years later in

de Doctrina Christiana Augustine was less

philosophical and far more Scriptural. They were the Christian classics.
Their truths were far more powerful than the truths found in the Roman
and Greek classics. In this sense Augustine has distanced himself from his
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Roman culture.
Now the question was, in what way did the Christian student of
Scriptures find the meaning of its truths and how did he communicate
them? Augustine's central hermeneutical principle was simple. If the
Scriptures didn't speak about charity (charitas) to one's God and to one's
fellow man, including one's enemies, then one did not read Scriptures
correctly. Augustine still retained his propensity to Plato's impractical
methodology of finding Truth, needing to find reality (res) behind the
words (signum). Therefore, although the Scriptures spoke of charity, the
discovery of the meaning of individual passages should be a difficult and
Platonic one. The deeper the meaning of a given passage the closer the
exegete will come to the throne of the one, immovable, unchangeable
God. In de Doctrina Christiana the Scriptures may have replaced in
Augustine's mind the Greek and Roman classics, yet he still used the
Socratic method of Plato to derive their meaning.
Augustine retained another connection to Roman society when
guiding the Scriptural exegete in practical manners of living.

It was

important for Augustine that the aspiring Scriptural exegete knew what
truths in Roman society to participate in. The truths of astrology, based

138

on a secret meaning in the position of the stars at a given time
(particularly at the time of a person's birth) were not to be trusted
because the human interpretation of their meaning varied with the
interpreter. Rather the Scriptural exegete should trust only the
predictable movements of the stars, for where they will be in the future
can be accurately predicted, and there was a common agreement on this
among men. Augustine was helping the scriptural exegete to move away
from participation in and reliance on the faulty notions of astrology. In
the modern sense of the word, he was suggesting a far more scientific
outlook on life for the Scriptural exegete and a far less superstitious
outlook.
Augustine made a similar suggestion with regard to customs and
institutions in Roman society. Those that were agreed upon by men were
true and can be trusted. Augustine moved away from the purely
impractical philosophical manner of looking at life when he urged his
Scriptural exegetes to pursue those things that were useful. The
prediction of the movement of the stars was useful; but astrology was
not. He viewed now the principles of rhetoric in a similar way. Now ten
years after his baptism, Augustine softened his approach to rhetoric. The
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Ciceronian principles of rhetoric can be put to use by the Christian orator
as long as he did not learn them per se from Augustine's school and as
long as he was unaware of them when he used them. It was clear, that in
spite of his resignation from his talk-shop and of the principles of
rhetoric, Augustine knew the importance of godly words delivered well.
Such skills can be put to use in the Catholic Church.
This brought us to Augustine's governing principle. Wherever the
Scriptural exegete found truth, it was the Lord's. Augustine's perception
of truth for the churchman was not limited to Scriptural truths, nor did
the churchman participate and accept all society's truths. In retaining
some of the classical methodology of education and rejecting other parts,
Augustine has indeed reformed and renewed the classical methodology of
education as he employed it for the services of the Catholic Church.
The question that remained was, which truths can be trusted. The
history of the church in Western Civilization answered this question: it
increasingly leaned away from the superstitious truths and toward the
scientific truths. Augustine, participating in an "Axial Point" of history,
had already begun the process of pointing the person of faith in the
Incarnate Word toward what we now know as scientific truth.
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Some Present Day Applications
Augustine wants his church leader to be a discerning person. He
wants his church leader to have been trained in the best educational
system of his day. His church leader doesn't get caught up in purely
sensual perceptions but knows his soul and the God who created his soul.
His church leader is gifted in words, in speaking, and in questioning the
cause of things. He is a happy person. He knows the beats vita because
he knows there is a divine design behind everything , including the evil
things that happen in life. This divine design includes the coming of the
one, immovable, unchangeable God in human flesh to save, heal, and
rescue sense-driven mankind.
There are some vocations that the person of faith can not
participate in like the uses of rhetoric that leads to vain glory or like
acting in a theatre that celebrates the immorality of the gods. Yet,
Augustine wants his church leader to speak well and to know what
manner of speaking is appropriate on any given occasion. Such virtues
would be an asset to a church leader of any age.
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